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Abstract
We study the multi-receiver wiretap channel with public and confidential messages.
In this channel, there is a transmitter that wishes to communicate with two legitimate
users in the presence of an external eavesdropper. The transmitter sends a pair of
public and confidential messages to each legitimate user. While there are no secrecy
constraints on the public messages, confidential messages need to be transmitted in
perfect secrecy. We study the discrete memoryless multi-receiver wiretap channel as
well as its Gaussian multi-input multi-output (MIMO) instance. First, we consider the
degraded discrete memoryless channel, and obtain an inner bound for the capacity re-
gion by using an achievable scheme that uses superposition coding and binning. Next,
we obtain an outer bound, and show that this outer bound partially matches the inner
bound, providing a partial characterization for the capacity region of the degraded
channel model. Second, we obtain an inner bound for the general, not necessarily
degraded, discrete memoryless channel by using Marton’s inner bound, superposition
coding, rate-splitting and binning. Third, we consider the degraded Gaussian MIMO
channel, and show that, to evaluate both the inner and outer bounds, considering
only jointly Gaussian auxiliary random variables and channel input is sufficient. Since
the inner and outer bounds partially match, these sufficiency results provide a partial
characterization of the capacity region of the degraded Gaussian MIMO channel. Fi-
nally, we provide an inner bound for the capacity region of the general, not necessarily
degraded, Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel.
∗This work was supported by NSF Grants CCF 07-29127, CNS 09-64632, CCF 09-64645 and CCF 10-
18185, and presented in part at the Allerton Conference on Communications, Control and Computing,
Monticello, IL, September 2010.
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1 Introduction
Information theoretic secrecy is initiated by Wyner in [1], where he introduces the wiretap
channel and obtains the capacity-equivocation region of a special class of wiretap channels.
Wyner considers the degraded wiretap channel, where the eavesdropper’s observation is a
degraded version of the legitimate user’s observation. His result is generalized to arbitrary,
not necessarily degraded, wiretap channels in [2]. Recently, the wiretap channel gathered a
renewed interest, and many multi-user extensions of the wiretap channel have been consid-
ered. One particular multi-user extension of the wiretap channel, that is relevant to our work
here, is the multi-receiver wiretap channel considered in [3–5]. A recent survey on the secure
broadcasting problem (including the multi-receiver wiretap channel) can be found in [6].
In the multi-receiver wiretap channel (see Figure 1) different from the basic wiretap
channel in [1,2], there are multiple legitimate users to which the transmitter sends confidential
messages in the presence of an external eavesdropper. These multiple confidential messages
need to be kept secret from the eavesdropper. References [3–5] consider the degraded multi-
receiver wiretap channel (see Figure 2), where the observations of the legitimate users and
the eavesdropper are arranged according to a degradedness order. References [3–5] study the
scenario where the transmitter sends a confidential message to each legitimate user where
these confidential messages need to be kept perfectly secret from the eavesdropper. The
capacity region of the degraded multi-receiver wiretap channel for this scenario is obtained
in [3] for two legitimate users, and in [4, 5] for an arbitrary number of legitimate users.
We note that to ensure the confidentiality of the messages in a multi-receiver wiretap
channel, each confidential message needs to be randomized by many dummy messages [4,5].
These dummy messages protect the confidential messages from the eavesdropper, and are
decoded by the legitimate users in addition to the confidential messages they receive. Hence,
indeed, the actual transmission rates are greater than the confidential message rates. This
also implies that the use of dummy messages can be viewed as a waste of resources since some
of the achievable rate is spent on transmitting them. To overcome this waste of resources,
these dummy messages can be replaced with some public messages on which there are no
secrecy constraints, as we do in this paper.
In this paper, both to overcome this waste of resources and also to understand the actual
possible transmission rates in a multi-receiver wiretap channel, we consider the scenario
where the transmitter sends a pair of public and confidential messages to each legitimate
user. While there are no secrecy concerns on the public messages, confidential messages need
to be transmitted in perfect secrecy. We call the channel model arising from this scenario
the multi-receiver wiretap channel with public and confidential messages.
The capacity region of the multi-receiver wiretap channel with public and confidential
messages is closely related to the capacity-equivocation region of the multi-receiver wiretap
channel. In the multi-receiver wiretap channel studied in [3–5] (see also [7] for its Gaussian
MIMO instance) each legitimate user receives only a single message which needs to be kept
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Figure 1: Multi-receiver wiretap channel.
perfectly secret from the eavesdropper. That is, [3–5,7] consider perfect secrecy for the mes-
sages. As in the single-user wiretap channel [1, 2], one can be interested in the rates and
equivocations of both messages simultaneously, i.e., in the simultaneously achievable quadru-
ples (R1, R1e, R2, R2e). This would be a four dimensional region, as in the model discussed
in this paper, where we have the rates Rp1, Rs1, Rp2, Rs2 for the rates of the confidential and
public messages of the two users. Unfortunately, unlike the single-user wiretap channel [1,2],
where (Rp, Rs) and (R,Re) have a one-to-one relationship [8–12], we do not have a one-to-one
relationship between (Rp1, Rs1, Rp2, Rs2) and (R1, R1e, R2, R2e). In this paper, we focus on
the public and confidential messages framework, and focus on the region (Rp1, Rs1, Rp2, Rs2).
Please see Section 2.1 for a more detailed treatment of the relationship between this region
and the capacity-equivocation region of the multi-receiver wiretap channel that consists of
the quadruples (R1, R1e, R2, R2e).
In this paper, we first consider the degraded discrete memoryless multi-receiver wiretap
channel. We propose an inner bound for the capacity region of the discrete memoryless
channel. This inner bound is based on an achievable scheme that combines superposition
coding [13] and binning. Binning has been used previously for the single-receiver and multi-
receiver wiretap channels in [1–5] to associate each confidential message with many code-
words, and hence to provide randomness for the confidential message to protect it from the
eavesdropper. In other words, by means of binning, the confidential message is embedded
into a doubly indexed codeword where one index denotes the confidential message and the
other index (dummy index) denotes the necessary randomness to ensure the confidentiality
of the message. This second index (dummy index) does not carry any information content.
Since in our channel model there are public messages, on which there are no secrecy
constraints, the protection of the confidential messages from the eavesdropper can be accom-
plished by using these public messages instead of the dummy messages. Thus, the difference
of binning used here from the binning used in [3–5] is that, here, the confusion messages carry
information, although there are no security guarantees on this information. Consequently,
the injection of public messages into the multi-receiver wiretap channel can be viewed as
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Figure 2: Degraded multi-receiver wiretap channel.
an effort to use the wasted transmission rate due to no-information bearing dummy indices,
since these dummy indices are now replaced with information-bearing public messages on
which there are no secrecy guarantees.
Next, we propose an outer bound for the capacity region of the degraded discrete mem-
oryless channel. We obtain this outer bound by combining the converse proof techniques
for the broadcast channel with degraded message sets [14] and the broadcast channel with
confidential messages [2]. This outer bound partially matches the inner bound we propose,
and therefore, it provides a partial characterization of the capacity region of the degraded
discrete memoryless channel. In particular, when we specialize these inner and outer bounds
by setting either the public message rate of the second legitimate user or the confidential
message rate of the first legitimate user to zero, they match and provide the exact capacity
region for these two scenarios. Moreover, when we set the rates of both of the public mes-
sages to zero, these inner and outer bounds match, and yield the secrecy capacity region of
the degraded discrete memoryless channel.
Second, we consider the general, not necessarily degraded, discrete memoryless multi-
receiver wiretap channel. We propose an inner bound for the capacity region of the general
channel by using Marton’s inner bound [15], superposition coding, rate-splitting and binning.
This inner bound generalizes the inner bound we proposed for the degraded case by using
Marton’s coding.
Third, we consider the degraded Gaussian multi-input multi-output (MIMO) instance
of this channel model. This generalizes our work in [7], where we consider the general,
not necessarily degraded, Gaussian MIMO channel only with confidential messages. For
the degraded Gaussian MIMO channel in this paper, we first show that it is sufficient to
consider jointly Gaussian auxiliary random variables and channel input for the evaluation of
the inner bound we proposed for the degraded discrete memoryless channel. In other words,
we prove that there is no other possible selection of auxiliary random variables and channel
input which can provide a rate vector outside the Gaussian rate region that is obtained
by using jointly Gaussian auxiliary random variables and channel input. We prove the
sufficiency of Gaussian auxiliary random variables and channel input by using the de Bruijn
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identity [16, 17], a differential relationship between the differential entropy and the Fisher
information matrix, in conjunction with the properties of the Fisher information matrix.
Next, we consider the outer bound we proposed for the degraded discrete memoryless
channel. We show that, similar to the inner bound, considering only jointly Gaussian aux-
iliary random variables and channel input is sufficient to evaluate this outer bound for the
degraded Gaussian MIMO channel. Indeed, this sufficiency result is already implied by the
sufficiency of jointly Gaussian auxiliary random variables and channel input for the inner
bound, because of the partial match between the inner and the outer bounds. Moreover, this
partial match also gives us a partial characterization of the capacity region of the degraded
Gaussian MIMO channel. The inner and outer bounds for the degraded Gaussian MIMO
channel completely match giving us the exact capacity region, when either the public mes-
sage rate of the second legitimate user or the confidential message rate of the first legitimate
user is zero. Moreover, these inner and outer bounds match for the secrecy capacity region
of the degraded Gaussian MIMO channel, which we obtain when we the rates of both of the
public messages are zero [7, 18].
Finally, we consider the general, not necessarily degraded, Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver
wiretap channel. We propose an inner bound for the capacity region of the general Gaussian
MIMO channel. We obtain this inner bound by using the achievable scheme we proposed for
the general discrete memoryless channel. In particular, we evaluate this achievable scheme
by using dirty-paper coding [19] to obtain an inner bound for the capacity region of the
general Gaussian MIMO channel.
2 Discrete Memoryless Multi-Receiver Wiretap Chan-
nels
In this section, we study discrete memoryless multi-receiver wiretap channels which consist
of a transmitter with input alphabet X , two legitimate users with output alphabets Y1,Y2,
and an eavesdropper with output alphabet Z. The channel is memoryless with a transition
probability p(y1, y2, z|x), where X ∈ X is the channel input, and Y1 ∈ Y1, Y2 ∈ Y2, Z ∈ Z
denote the channel outputs of the first legitimate user, the second legitimate user, and the
eavesdropper, respectively.
We consider the scenario in which, the transmitter sends a pair of public and confidential
messages to each legitimate user. While there are no secrecy constraints on the public
messages, the confidential messages need to be transmitted in perfect secrecy. We call the
channel model arising from this scenario the multi-receiver wiretap channel with public and
confidential messages.
An (n, 2nRp1, 2nRs1 , 2nRp2, 2nRs2) code for this channel consists of four message sets,Wp1 =
{1, . . . , 2nRp1}, Ws1 = {1, . . . , 2
nRs1}, Wp2 = {1, . . . , 2
nRp2}, Ws2 = {1, . . . , 2
nRs2}, one en-
coder at the transmitter f : Wp1 × Ws1 × Wp2 × Ws2 → X
n, and one decoder at each
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legitimate user gj : Y
n
j → Wpj × Wsj , for j = 1, 2. The probability of error is de-
fined as P ne = max{P
n
e,1, P
n
e,2}, where P
n
e,j = Pr[gj(Y
n
j ) 6= (Wpj,Wsj)], for j = 1, 2, and
Wp1,Ws1,Wp2,Ws2 are uniformly distributed random variables in Wp1,Ws1,Wp2,Ws2, re-
spectively. A rate tuple (Rp1, Rs1, Rp2, Rs2) is said to be achievable if there exists an
(n, 2nRp1, 2nRs1 , 2nRp2, 2nRs2) code which satisfies limn→∞ P
n
e = 0 and
lim
n→∞
1
n
I(Ws1,Ws2;Z
n) = 0 (1)
We note that the perfect secrecy requirement given by (1) implies the following individual
perfect secrecy requirements
lim
n→∞
1
n
I(Ws1;Z
n) = 0 and lim
n→∞
1
n
I(Ws2;Z
n) = 0 (2)
The capacity region of the multi-receiver wiretap channel with public and confidential
messages is defined as the convex closure of all achievable rate tuples (Rp1, Rs1, Rp2, Rs2),
and is denoted by C.
In Section 2.2, we study degraded multi-receiver wiretap channels which satisfy the fol-
lowing Markov chain
X → Y1 → Y2 → Z (3)
2.1 Capacity-Equivocation Region of the Multi-Receiver Wiretap
Channel
In this section, we consider the capacity-equivocation region of the multi-receiver wiretap
channel and discuss its connection to the capacity region of the multi-receiver wiretap channel
with public and confidential messages. To this end, we consider both rates and equivocations
of the messages in the multi-receiver wiretap channel. Each legitimate user receives a single
message which needs to be kept hidden as much as possible from the eavesdropper. In par-
ticular, each message has its own rate and a corresponding equivocation. The equivocations
are quantified by the following conditional entropies:
1
n
H(W1|Z
n) and
1
n
H(W2|Z
n) and
1
n
H(W1,W2|Z
n) (4)
An (n, 2nR1, 2nRe1 , 2nR2, 2nRe2) code for this channel consists of two message sets, W1 =
{1, . . . , 2nR1}, W2 = {1, . . . , 2
nR2}, one encoder at the transmitter f : W1 × W2 → X
n,
and one decoder at each legitimate user gj : Y
n
j → Wj , for j = 1, 2. The probability of
error is defined as P ne = max{P
n
e,1, P
n
e,2}, where P
n
e,j = Pr[gj(Y
n
j ) 6= Wj], for j = 1, 2, and
W1,W2 are uniformly distributed random variables in W1,W2, respectively. A rate tuple
(R1, Re1, R2, Re2) is said to be achievable if there exists an (n, 2
nR1, 2nRe1 , 2nR2, 2nRe2) code
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which satisfies limn→∞ P
n
e = 0 and
Re1 ≤ lim
n→∞
1
n
H(W1|Z
n) (5)
Re2 ≤ lim
n→∞
1
n
H(W2|Z
n) (6)
Re1 +Re2 ≤ lim
n→∞
1
n
H(W1,W2|Z
n) (7)
The capacity-equivocation region of the multi-receiver wiretap channel is defined as the
convex closure of all achievable rate tuples (R1, Re1, R2, Re2), and is denoted by C
e.
We now have some remarks about the definition of the equivocations by (5)-(7). First,
if we consider the perfect secrecy rates, i.e., Re1 = R1, Re2 = R2, then the last constraint
in (7) is sufficient, since this last constraint implies the individual constraints in (5)-(6).
Our second remark is about the sum equivocation constraint in (7). If we consider the
single-legitimate user case as in [1, 2], we have only one of the two constraints in (5)-(6) as
equivocation. A direct generalization of this definition to the multiple legitimate user case
already yields the individual constraints in (5)-(6), however here we put one more constraint
by (7). The reason behind this additional sum equivocation constraint in (7) is as follows.
The individual constraints in (5)-(6) consider the possibility that the eavesdropper can try
to decode W1 and W2 separately, however, these two individual constraints in (5)-(6) do not
consider the possibility that the eavesdropper might try to decode W1,W2 jointly. Thus,
to reflect the possibility that the eavesdropper might try to decode W1,W2 jointly on the
equivocations, we include the sum equivocation constraint in (7).
Next, we discuss the connection between the capacity region of the multi-receiver wiretap
channel with public and confidential messages and the capacity-equivocation region of the
multi-receiver wiretap channel. For the single-legitimate user case, there is a one-to-one
correspondence between these two regions as stated in the following lemma [8–12].
Lemma 1 (Rp1, Rs1, 0, 0) ∈ C iff (R1 = Rp1 +Rs1, Re1 = Rs1, 0, 0) ∈ C
e.
The “if” part of this lemma follows from the definitions of the two regions. However, the
“only if” part of this lemma uses the properties of the capacity achieving coding scheme for
the region Ces
1. Since as of now we do not know the capacity-achieving scheme for Ce, we
can provide only a partial generalization of Lemma 1 to the multiple legitimate user case as
stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 If (Rp1, Rs1, Rp2, Rs2) ∈ C, we have (R1 = Rp1 + Rs1, Re1 = Rs1, R2 = Rp2 +
Rs2, Re2 = Rs2) ∈ C
e.
Lemma 2 can be proved by using the definitions of C and Ce. This lemma states that all
inner bounds we obtain for C also serve as inner bounds for Ce. Indeed, the outer bounds we
1Ce
s
denotes the capacity-equivocation region for the single legitimate user case.
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obtain for C and the capacity results we obtain for the sub-regions of C (a sub-region of C is
a region that can be obtained from C by setting one or more of the four rates involved in C
to zero) can be shown to be valid for Ce.
2.2 Degraded Channels
In this section, we consider the degraded multi-receiver wiretap channel. We first present an
inner bound for C in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 An achievable rate region for the multi-receiver wiretap channel with public and
confidential messages is given by the union of rate tuples (Rp1, Rs1, Rp2, Rs2) satisfying
Rs2 ≤ I(U ; Y2)− I(U ;Z) (8)
Rs1 +Rs2 ≤ I(U ; Y2) + I(X ; Y1|U)− I(X ;Z) (9)
Rp2 +Rs2 ≤ I(U ; Y2) (10)
Rs1 +Rp2 +Rs2 ≤ I(U ; Y2) + I(X ; Y1|U)− I(X ;Z|U) (11)
Rp1 +Rs1 +Rp2 +Rs2 ≤ I(U ; Y2) + I(X ; Y1|U) (12)
where (U,X) satisfy the following Markov chain
U → X → Y1 → Y2 → Z (13)
The achievable rate region given by Theorem 1 can be obtained from Theorem 3, which
will be introduced in the next section. Here, we provide an outline of the proof of Theorem 1.
We prove Theorem 1 in two steps. As a first step, one can show that the rate tuples
(Rp1, Rs1, Rp2, Rs2) satisfying
Rp2 ≤ I(U ;Z) (14)
Rs2 ≤ I(U ; Y2)− I(U ;Z) (15)
Rp1 ≤ I(X ;Z|U) (16)
Rs1 ≤ I(X ; Y1|U)− I(X ;Z|U) (17)
are achievable, where (U,X) satisfy (13). We show the achievability of rate tuples (Rp1, Rs1,
Rp2, Rs2) satisfying (14)-(17) by using superposition coding. The differences of the super-
position coding used here from the original superposition coding that attains the capacity
region of the degraded broadcast channel [13] are that both public and confidential mes-
sages of a legitimate user are transmitted by the same layer of the codebook, and the public
messages provide the necessary randomness to protect the confidential messages from the
eavesdropper. In other words, in addition to their information content, the public mes-
sages also serve as the confusion messages that prevent the eavesdropper from decoding the
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confidential messages.
We also note that the achievability of the region given in (14)-(17) can be concluded by
using the achievable scheme in [3–5], which was designed for the degraded multi-receiver wire-
tap channel only with confidential messages. This achievable scheme also uses superposition
coding and binning. In this scheme, to achieve the confidential message rates
Rs2 = I(U ; Y2)− I(U ;Z) (18)
Rs1 = I(X ; Y1|U)− I(X ;Z|U) (19)
each confidential message rate is equipped with the rate of some dummy messages, which
provide the necessary protection for the confidential messages against the eavesdropper.
In particular, the confidential message rates Rs2 and Rs1 are equipped with the following
dummy message rates
R˜s2 = I(U ;Z) (20)
R˜s1 = I(X ;Z|U) (21)
where R˜sj is the dummy message rate spent for the jth legitimate user’s confidential message
rate Rsj . Since in our channel model there are public messages on which there are no secrecy
constraints, these dummy message rates can be used as public message rates yielding the
achievable rate region given in (14)-(17). We note that the presence of public messages in
our channel model prevents the waste of resources due to the transmission of the dummy
messages at rates given by (20)-(21) to protect the confidential messages.
As the second step to prove Theorem 1, one can use the following facts
• since confidential messages can be considered as public messages as well, each legitimate
user’s confidential message rate Rsj can be given up in favor of its public message rate
Rpj, i.e., if (Rp1, Rs1, Rp2, Rs2) is achievable, (Rp1 + α1, Rs1− α1, Rp2 + α2, Rs2− α2) is
also achievable for any non-negative (α1, α2) pairs satisfying αj ≤ Rsj ,
• since the channel is degraded, the second legitimate user’s confidential message rate Rs2
can be given up in favor of the first legitimate user’s public and confidential message
rates Rp1 and Rs1, i.e., if (Rp1, Rs1, Rp2, Rs2) is achievable, (Rp1+α,Rs1+β,Rp2, Rs2−
α− β) is also achievable for any non-negative (α, β) pairs satisfying α + β ≤ Rs2,
• since the channel is degraded, the second legitimate user’s public message rate Rp2
can be given up in favor of the first legitimate user’s public message rate Rp1, i.e., if
(Rp1, Rs1, Rp2, Rs2) is achievable, (Rp1 + α,Rs1, Rp2− α,Rs2) is also achievable for any
non-negative α satisfying α ≤ Rp2,
in conjunction with Fourier-Motzkin elimination, and show that the region given in (14)-(17)
is equivalent to the one given in (8)-(12).
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The reason we state the achievable rate region by using the bounds in (8)-(12) instead of
the bounds in (14)-(17) is that the former expressions simplify the comparison of the inner
bound with the outer bound which will be introduced in the sequel. Another reason that
we state achievable region by using the bounds in (8)-(12) is that they are more convenient
for an explicit evaluation for the case of degraded Gaussian MIMO channel, which will be
considered in Section 3.2.
Now, we introduce the following outer bound for the capacity region of the degraded
discrete memoryless multi-receiver wiretap channel with public and confidential messages.
Theorem 2 The capacity region of the degraded multi-receiver wiretap channel with pub-
lic and confidential messages is contained in the union of rate tuples (Rp1, Rs1, Rp2, Rs2)
satisfying
Rs2 ≤ I(U ; Y2)− I(U ;Z) (22)
Rs1 +Rs2 ≤ I(U ; Y2) + I(X ; Y1|U)− I(X ;Z) (23)
Rp2 +Rs2 ≤ I(U ; Y2) (24)
Rp1 +Rs1 +Rp2 +Rs2 ≤ I(U ; Y2) + I(X ; Y1|U) (25)
for some (U,X) such that U,X exhibit the following Markov chain
U → X → Y1 → Y2 → Z (26)
The proof of Theorem 2 is given in Appendix A. This outer bound provides a partial
converse for the capacity region of the degraded multi-receiver wiretap channel because the
only difference between the inner bound in Theorem 1 and the outer bound in Theorem 2 is
the bound on Rs1+Rp2+Rs2 given by (11). In particular, in addition to the bounds defining
the outer bound for the capacity region, the inner bound includes the following constraint
Rs1 +Rp2 +Rs2 ≤ I(U ; Y2) + I(X ; Y1|U)− I(X ;Z|U) (27)
Besides that, the inner and outer bounds are identical.
Despite this difference, there are cases for which the exact capacity region can be obtained.
First, we note that the inner bound in Theorem 1 and the outer bound in Theorem 2 match
when the confidential message rate of the first legitimate user is zero, i.e., Rs1 = 0.
Corollary 1 The capacity region of the degraded multi-receiver wiretap channel without the
first legitimate user’s confidential message is given by the union of rate triples (Rp1, Rp2, Rs2)
10
satisfying
Rs2 ≤ I(U ; Y2)− I(U ;Z) (28)
Rs2 +Rp2 ≤ I(U ; Y2) (29)
Rp1 +Rp2 +Rs2 ≤ I(U ; Y2) + I(X ; Y1|U) (30)
where U,X exhibit the following Markov chain
U → X → Y1 → Y2 → Z (31)
Corollary 1 can be proved by setting Rs1 = 0 in both Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 and
eliminating the redundant bounds.
Next, we note that the inner bound in Theorem 1 and the outer bound in Theorem 2
match when the public message rate of the second legitimate user is zero, i.e., Rp2 = 0.
Corollary 2 The capacity region of the degraded multi-receiver wiretap channel without the
second legitimate user’s public message is given by the union of rate triples (Rp1, Rs1, Rs2)
satisfying
Rs2 ≤ I(U ; Y2)− I(U ;Z) (32)
Rs1 +Rs2 ≤ I(U ; Y2) + I(X ; Y1|U)− I(X ;Z) (33)
Rp1 +Rs1 +Rs2 ≤ I(U ; Y2) + I(X ; Y1|U) (34)
where U,X exhibit the following Markov chain
U → X → Y1 → Y2 → Z (35)
Corollary 2 can be proved by setting Rp2 = 0 in both Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 and
eliminating the redundant bounds.
Corollary 2 also implies that the inner bound in Theorem 1 and the outer bound in
Theorem 2 match on the secrecy capacity region of the degraded multi-receiver wiretap
channel. In particular, the inner bound in Theorem 1 and the outer bound in Theorem 2
match if the rates of both public messages are set to zero, i.e., Rp1 = Rp2 = 0. The secrecy
capacity region of the degraded multi-receiver wiretap channel is given by the following
corollary.
Corollary 3 ([3–5]) The secrecy capacity region of the degraded multi-receiver wiretap chan-
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nel is given by the union of rate pairs (Rs1, Rs2) satisfying
2
Rs2 ≤ I(U ; Y2)− I(U ;Z) (36)
Rs1 +Rs2 ≤ I(U ; Y2) + I(X ; Y1|U)− I(X ;Z) (37)
where U,X exhibit the following Markov chain
U → X → Y1 → Y2 → Z (38)
We note that in addition to its representation in Corollary 3, the secrecy capacity region
of the degraded multi-receiver wiretap channel can be stated in an alternative form as the
union of rate pairs (Rs1, Rs2) satisfying
Rs2 ≤ I(U ; Y2)− I(U ;Z) (39)
Rs1 ≤ I(X ; Y1|U)− I(X ;Z|U) (40)
where U,X exhibit the Markov chain in (38).
2.3 General Channels
We now consider the general, not necessarily degraded, discrete memoryless multi-receiver
wiretap channel with public and confidential messages. We propose an inner bound for the
capacity region of the general discrete memoryless multi-receiver wiretap channel as follows.
Theorem 3 An achievable rate region for the discrete memoryless multi-receiver wiretap
channel with public and confidential messages is given by the union of rate tuples (Rp1, Rs1, Rp2,
Rs2) satisfying
Rs1 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj|Q) + I(V1; Y1|U)− I(U, V1;Z|Q) (41)
Rs2 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj|Q) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(U, V2;Z|Q) (42)
Rs1 +Rs2 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj|Q) + I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V1;V2|U)
− I(U, V1, V2;Z|Q) (43)
Rs1 +Rp1 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) + I(V1; Y1|U) (44)
Rs2 +Rp2 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) + I(V2; Y2|U) (45)
Rs1 +Rp1 +Rs2 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) + I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V2;Z|U) (46)
2The secrecy capacity region of the degraded multi-receiver wiretap channel for an arbitrary number of
legitimate users can be found in [4, 5].
12
Rs1 +Rp1 +Rs2 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) + 2I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V1;V2|U)
− I(V1, V2;Z|U) (47)
Rs1 +Rs2 +Rp2 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) + I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V1;Z|U) (48)
Rs1 +Rs2 +Rp2 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) + I(V1; Y1|U) + 2I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V1;V2|U)
− I(V1, V2;Z|U) (49)
Rs1 +Rp1 +Rs2 +Rp2 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) + I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V1;V2|U) (50)
for some Q,U, V1, V2 such that p(q, u, v1, v2, x, y1, y2, z) = p(q, u)p(v1, v2, x|u)p(y1, y2, z|x).
The proof of Theorem 3 is given in Appendix B. We note that if one sets Q = φ, V2 =
U, V1 = X in Theorem 3, the achievable rate region in Theorem 3 reduces to the one provided
in Theorem 1. Thus, the achievable scheme in Theorem 3 can be seen as a generalization of
the achievable scheme in Theorem 1, where we achieve this generalization by using Marton’s
coding and rate-splitting in addition to the superposition coding and binning that were
already used for the achievable scheme in Theorem 1.
Next, we provide an outline of the achievable scheme in Theorem 3. In this achievable
scheme, we first divide each public message Wpj into three parts as W
1
pj,W
2
pj,W
3
pj, where
the rates of the messages W 1pj ,W
2
pj,W
3
pj are given by R
1
pj , R
2
pj, R
3
pj, respectively, and Rpj =
R1pj + R
2
pj + R
3
pj. Similarly, we divide each confidential message Wsj into two parts as
W 1sj,W
2
sj, where the rates of the messages W
1
sj,W
2
sj are given by R
1
sj , R
2
sj, respectively, and
Rsj = R
1
sj +R
2
sj. The first parts of the public messages, i.e., W
1
p1 and W
1
p2, are sent through
the sequences generated by Q. The second parts of the public messages, i.e., W 2p1 and
W 2p2, and the first parts of the confidential messages, i.e., W
1
s1 and W
1
s2, are sent through the
sequences generated by U . Both legitimate receivers decode these sequences, and hence, each
legitimate receiver decodes the parts of the other legitimate user’s public and confidential
messages. The last parts of each public message and each confidential message, i.e., W 3pj
and W 2sj, are encoded by the sequences generated through Vj. This encoding is performed
by using Marton’s coding [15]. Each legitimate receiver, after decoding Qn and Un, decodes
the sequences V nj . The details of the proof is given in Appendix B.
3 Gaussian MIMO Multi-Receiver Wiretap Channels
Here, we consider the Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel which is defined by
Y1 = X+N1 (51)
Y2 = X+N2 (52)
Z = X+NZ (53)
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where the channel input X is subject to a covariance constraint
E
[
XX⊤
]
 S (54)
where S ≻ 0 and N1,N2,NZ are zero-mean Gaussian random vectors with covariance ma-
trices Σ1,Σ2,ΣZ , respectively.
In Section 3.2, we consider degraded Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channels for
which the noise covariance matrices Σ1,Σ2,ΣZ satisfy the following order
0 ≺ Σ1  Σ2  ΣZ (55)
In a multi-receiver wiretap channel, since the capacity region depends only on the conditional
marginal distributions of the transmitter-receiver links, but not on the entire joint distribu-
tion of the channel, the correlations among N1,N2,NZ do not affect the capacity region.
Thus, without changing the corresponding capacity region, we can adjust the correlation
structure among these noise vectors to ensure that they satisfy the Markov chain
X→ Y1 → Y2 → Z (56)
which is always possible because of our assumption about the covariance matrices in (55).
Thus, for any Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel satisfying the order in (55),
we can assume that it also exhibits the Markov chain in (56) without changing the capacity
region of the original channel.
3.1 Comments on the Channel Model and the Covariance Con-
straint
We provide some comments about the way we define the Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver
wiretap channel. The first one is about the covariance constraint in (54). Though it is more
common to define capacity regions under a total power constraint, i.e., tr
(
E
[
XX⊤
])
≤ P ,
the covariance constraint in (54) is more general and it subsumes the total power constraint
as a special case [20]. In particular, if we denote the capacity region under the constraint in
(54) by C(S), then the capacity region under the trace constraint, tr
(
E
[
XX⊤
])
≤ P , can
be written as [20]
Ctrace(P ) =
⋃
S:tr(S)≤P
C(S) (57)
Similarly, the inner and outer bounds obtained for the covariance constraint in (54) can be
extended to provide the corresponding inner and outer bounds for the total power constraint.
The second comment is about our assumption that S is strictly positive definite. This
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assumption does not lead to any loss of generality because for any Gaussian MIMO multi-
receiver wiretap channel with a positive semi-definite covariance constraint, i.e., S  0 and
|S| = 0, we can always construct an equivalent channel with the constraint E
[
XX⊤
]
 S′
where S′ ≻ 0 (see Lemma 2 of [20]), which has the same capacity region.
The last comment is about the assumption that the transmitter and all receivers have
the same number of antennas. This assumption is implicit in the channel definition, see
(51)-(53), and also in the definition of degradedness, see (55). However, we can extend the
definition of the Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel to include the cases where
the number of transmit antennas and the number of receive antennas at each receiver are
not necessarily the same by introducing the following channel model
Y1 = H1X+N1 (58)
Y2 = H2X+N2 (59)
Z = HZX+NZ (60)
where H1,H2,HZ are the channel matrices of sizes r1 × t, r2 × t, rZ × t, respectively, and X
is of size t× 1. The channel outputs Y1,Y2,Z are of sizes r1× 1, r2× 1, rZ × 1, respectively.
The Gaussian noise vectors N1,N2,NZ are assumed to have identity covariance matrices.
Next, we introduce the definition of the degradedness for the channel model given in
(58)-(60) [21]. The Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel in (58)-(60) is said to
be degraded (according to the Markov chain X → Y1 → Y2 → Z) if the following two
conditions hold:
• There is a matrix D21 which satisfies H2 = D21H1 and D21D
⊤
21  I,
• There is a matrix DZ2 which satisfies HZ = DZ2H2 and DZ2D
⊤
Z2  I.
In the rest of the paper, we consider the channel model given in (51)-(53) instead of the
channel model given in (58)-(60), which is more general. However, the inner bounds, the
outer bounds, and the capacity regions we obtain for the Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver
wiretap channel defined by (51)-(53) can be extended to provide the inner bounds, the outer
bounds, the capacity regions, respectively, for the Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap
channel defined by (58)-(60) using the analysis carried out in Section V of [21] and Section
7.1 of [7]. Thus, focusing on the channel model in (51)-(53) does not result in any loss of
generality.
3.2 Degraded Channels
We first provide an inner bound for the capacity region of the degraded Gaussian MIMO
multi-receiver wiretap channel with public and confidential messages by using Theorem 1.
The corresponding achievable rate region is stated in the following theorem.
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Theorem 4 An achievable rate region for the degraded Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wire-
tap channel with public and confidential messages is given by the union of rate tuples (Rp1, Rs1,
Rp2, Rs2) satisfying
Rs2 ≤
1
2
log
|S+Σ2|
|K+Σ2|
−
1
2
log
|S+ΣZ|
|K+ΣZ |
(61)
Rs1 +Rs2 ≤
1
2
log
|S+Σ2|
|K+Σ2|
+
1
2
log
|K+Σ1|
|Σ1|
−
1
2
log
|S+ΣZ|
|ΣZ|
(62)
Rs2 +Rp2 ≤
1
2
log
|S+Σ2|
|K+Σ2|
(63)
Rs1 +Rs2 +Rp2 ≤
1
2
log
|S+Σ2|
|K+Σ2|
+
1
2
log
|K+Σ1|
|Σ1|
−
1
2
log
|K+ΣZ |
|ΣZ |
(64)
Rs1 +Rs2 +Rp1 +Rp2 ≤
1
2
log
|S+Σ2|
|K+Σ2|
+
1
2
log
|K+Σ1|
|Σ1|
(65)
where K is a positive semi-definite matrix satisfying K  S.
This achievable rate region given in Theorem 4 can be obtained by evaluating the achiev-
able rate region in Theorem 1 for the degraded Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap
channel by using the following selection for U,X: i) U is a zero-mean Gaussian random vec-
tor with covariance matrix S−K, ii) X = U +U ′ where U ′ is a zero-mean Gaussian random
vector with covariance matrix K, and is independent of U . We note that besides this jointly
Gaussian (U,X) selection, there might be other possible (U,X) selections which may yield
a larger region than the one obtained by using jointly Gaussian (U,X). However, we show
that jointly Gaussian (U,X) selection is sufficient to evaluate the achievable rate region in
Theorem 1 for the degraded Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel. In other words,
jointly Gaussian (U,X) selection exhausts the achievable rate region in Theorem 1 for the
degraded Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel. This sufficiency result is stated
in the following theorem.
Theorem 5 For the degraded Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel, the achiev-
able rate region in Theorem 1 is exhausted by jointly Gaussian (U,X). In particular, for any
non-Gaussian (U,X), there exists a Gaussian (UG,XG) which yields a larger region than the
one obtained by using the non-Gaussian (U,X).
Next, we provide an outer bound for the capacity region of the degraded Gaussian MIMO
multi-receiver wiretap channel. This outer bound can be obtained by evaluating the outer
bound given in Theorem 2 for the degraded Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel.
This evaluation is tantamount to finding the optimal (U,X) which exhausts the outer bound
in Theorem 2 for the degraded Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel. We show
that jointly Gaussian (U,X) is sufficient to exhaust the outer bound in Theorem 2 for the
degraded Gaussian MIMO channel. The corresponding outer bound is stated in the following
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theorem.
Theorem 6 The capacity region of the degraded Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap
channel is contained in the union of rate tuples (Rp1, Rs1, Rp2, Rs2) satisfying
Rs2 ≤
1
2
log
|S+Σ2|
|K+Σ2|
−
1
2
log
|S+ΣZ |
|K+ΣZ |
(66)
Rs1 +Rs2 ≤
1
2
log
|S+Σ2|
|K+Σ2|
+
1
2
log
|K+Σ1|
|Σ1|
−
1
2
log
|S+ΣZ |
|ΣZ |
(67)
Rs2 +Rp2 ≤
1
2
log
|S+Σ2|
|K+Σ2|
(68)
Rs1 +Rs2 +Rp1 +Rp2 ≤
1
2
log
|S+Σ2|
|K+Σ2|
+
1
2
log
|K+Σ1|
|Σ1|
(69)
where K is a positive semi-definite matrix satisfying K  S.
The proofs of Theorem 5 and Theorem 6 are given in Appendix D. We prove Theorem 5
and Theorem 6 by using the de Bruijn identity [16, 17], a differential relationship between
differential entropy and the Fisher information matrix, in conjunction with the properties of
the Fisher information matrix. In particular, to prove Theorem 5, we consider the region in
Theorem 1, and show that for any non-Gaussian (U,X), there exists a Gaussian (UG,XG)
which yields a larger region than the one that is obtained by evaluating the region in The-
orem 1 with the non-Gaussian (U,X). We note that this proof of Theorem 5 implies the
proof of Theorem 6. In particular, since the region in Theorem 1 includes all the constraints
involved in the outer bound given in Theorem 2, the proof of Theorem 5 reveals that for any
non-Gaussian (U,X), there exists a Gaussian (UG,XG) which yields a larger region than the
one that is obtained by evaluating the region in Theorem 2 with the non-Gaussian (U,X).
We note that the only difference between the inner and the outer bounds for the degraded
Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap given in Theorem 4 and Theorem 6, respectively,
comes from the bound in (64). In other words, there is one more constraint in the inner
bound given by Theorem 4 than the outer bound given by Theorem 6. This additional
constraint is
Rs1 +Rs2 +Rp2 ≤
1
2
log
|S+Σ2|
|K+Σ2|
+
1
2
log
|K+Σ1|
|Σ1|
−
1
2
log
|K+ΣZ |
|ΣZ |
(70)
Besides this constraint on Rs1 + Rs2 + Rp2, the inner bound in Theorem 4 and the outer
bound in Theorem 6 are the same.
We conclude this section by providing the cases where the inner bound in Theorem 4
and the outer bound in Theorem 6 match. We first note that the inner bound in Theorem 4
and the outer bound in Theorem 6 match when the confidential message rate of the first
legitimate user is zero, i.e., Rs1 = 0. The corresponding capacity region is given by the
following corollary.
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Corollary 4 The capacity region of the degraded Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap
channel without the first legitimate user’s confidential message is given by the union of rate
tuples (Rp1, Rp2, Rs2) satisfying
Rs2 ≤
1
2
log
|S+Σ2|
|K+Σ2|
−
1
2
log
|S+ΣZ |
|K+ΣZ|
(71)
Rs2 +Rp2 ≤
1
2
log
|S+Σ2|
|K+Σ2|
(72)
Rs2 +Rp1 +Rp2 ≤
1
2
log
|S+Σ2|
|K+Σ2|
+
1
2
log
|K+Σ1|
|Σ1|
(73)
where K is a positive semi-definite matrix satisfying K  S.
We note that Corollary 4 is the Gaussian MIMO version of Corollary 1 which obtains the
capacity region of the degraded discrete memoryless multi-receiver wiretap channel without
the first legitimate user’s confidential message. Corollary 4 can be proved by setting Rs1 = 0
in both Theorem 4 and Theorem 6 and eliminating the redundant bounds.
We next note that the inner bound in Theorem 4 and the outer bound in Theorem 6
match when the public message rate of the second legitimate user is zero, i.e., Rp2 = 0. The
corresponding capacity region is stated in the following corollary.
Corollary 5 The capacity region of the degraded Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap
channel without the second legitimate user’s public message is given by the union of rate
tuples (Rp1, Rs1, Rs2) satisfying
Rs2 ≤
1
2
log
|S+Σ2|
|K+Σ2|
−
1
2
log
|S+ΣZ |
|K+ΣZ |
(74)
Rs1 +Rs2 ≤
1
2
log
|S+Σ2|
|K+Σ2|
+
1
2
log
|K+Σ1|
|Σ1|
−
1
2
log
|S+ΣZ |
|ΣZ |
(75)
Rs1 +Rs2 +Rp1 ≤
1
2
log
|S+Σ2|
|K+Σ2|
+
1
2
log
|K+Σ1|
|Σ1|
(76)
where K is a positive semi-definite matrix satisfying K  S.
We note that Corollary 5 is the Gaussian MIMO version of Corollary 2 which obtains the
capacity region of the degraded discrete memoryless multi-receiver wiretap channel without
the second legitimate user’s public message. Corollary 5 can be proved by setting Rp2 = 0
in both Theorem 4 and Theorem 6 and eliminating the redundant bounds.
Corollary 5 also implies that the inner bound in Theorem 4 and the outer bound in
Theorem 6 match for the secrecy capacity region of the degraded Gaussian MIMO multi-
receiver wiretap channel. In particular, the inner bound Theorem 4 and the outer bound in
Theorem 6 match if the rates of both public messages are set to zero, i.e., Rp1 = Rp2 = 0.
The secrecy capacity region of the degraded multi-receiver wiretap channel is given by the
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following corollary.
Corollary 6 ([7, 18]) The secrecy capacity region of the degraded Gaussian MIMO multi-
receiver wiretap channel is given by the union of rate pairs (Rs1, Rs2) satisfying
3
Rs2 ≤
1
2
log
|S+Σ2|
|K+Σ2|
−
1
2
log
|S+ΣZ|
|K+ΣZ |
(77)
Rs2 +Rs1 ≤
1
2
log
|S+Σ2|
|K+Σ2|
+
1
2
log
|K+Σ1|
|Σ1|
−
1
2
log
|S+ΣZ|
|ΣZ|
(78)
where K is a positive semi-definite matrix satisfying K  S.
We note that in addition to its representation in Corollary 6, the secrecy capacity region of
the degraded Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel can be stated in an alternative
form as the union of rate pairs (Rs1, Rs2) satisfying
Rs2 ≤
1
2
log
|S+Σ2|
|K+Σ2|
−
1
2
log
|S+ΣZ|
|K+ΣZ |
(79)
Rs1 ≤
1
2
log
|K+Σ1|
|Σ1|
−
1
2
log
|K+ΣZ |
|ΣZ|
(80)
where K is positive semi-definite matrix satisfying K  S.
3.3 General Channels
Here we consider the general, i.e., not necessarily degraded, Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver
wiretap channel with public and confidential messages, and propose an inner bound for the
capacity region of the general Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel as follows.
Theorem 7 An achievable rate region for the general Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wire-
tap channel with public and confidential messages is given by
conv (R12(K0,K1,K2) ∪ R21(K0,K1,K2)) (81)
where R21(K0,K1,K2) is given by the union of rate tuples (Rp1, Rs1, Rp2, Rs2) satisfying
Rs1 ≤ min
j=1,2
1
2
log
|K0 +K1 +K2 +Σj|
|K1 +K2 +Σj |
+
1
2
log
|K1 +Σ1|
|Σ1|
−
1
2
log
|K0 +K1 +K2 +ΣZ|
|K1 +K2 +ΣZ |
−
1
2
log
|K1 +ΣZ|
|ΣZ |
(82)
3The secrecy capacity region of the general, not necessarily degraded, Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver
wiretap channel for an arbitrary number of legitimate users can be found in [7].
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Rs2 ≤ min
j=1,2
1
2
log
|K0 +K1 +K2 +Σj |
|K1 +K2 +Σj|
+
1
2
log
|K1 +K2 +Σ2|
|K1 +Σ2|
−
1
2
log
|K0 +K1 +K2 +ΣZ |
|K1 +ΣZ|
(83)
Rs1 +Rs2 ≤ min
j=1,2
1
2
log
|K0 +K1 +K2 +Σj |
|K1 +K2 +Σj|
+
1
2
log
|K1 +K2 +Σ2|
|K1 +Σ2|
+
1
2
log
|K1 +Σ1|
|Σ1|
−
1
2
log
|K0 +K1 +K2 +ΣZ |
|ΣZ |
(84)
Rs1 +Rp1 ≤ min
j=1,2
1
2
log
|S+Σj|
|K1 +K2 +Σj|
+
1
2
log
|K1 +Σ1|
|Σ1|
(85)
Rs2 +Rp2 ≤ min
j=1,2
1
2
log
|S+Σj|
|K1 +K2 +Σj|
+
1
2
log
|K1 +K2 +Σ2|
|K1 +Σ2|
(86)
Rs1 +Rp1 +Rs2 ≤ min
j=1,2
1
2
log
|S+Σj|
|K1 +K2 +Σj|
+
1
2
log
|K1 +Σ1|
|Σ1|
+
1
2
log
|K1 +K2 +Σ2|
|K1 +Σ2|
−
1
2
log
|K1 +K2 +ΣZ |
|K1 +ΣZ |
(87)
Rs1 +Rs2 +Rp2 ≤ min
j=1,2
1
2
log
|S+Σj|
|K1 +K2 +Σj|
+
1
2
log
|K1 +K2 +Σ2|
|K1 +Σ2|
+
1
2
log
|K1 +Σ1|
|Σ1|
−
1
2
log
|K1 +ΣZ |
|ΣZ|
(88)
Rs1 +Rp1 +Rs2 +Rp2 ≤ min
j=1,2
1
2
log
|S+Σj|
|K1 +K2 +Σj|
+
1
2
log
|K1 +K2 +Σ2|
|K1 +Σ2|
+
1
2
log
|K1 +Σ1|
|Σ1|
(89)
for some positive semi-definite matricesK0,K1,K2 satisfyingK0+K1+K2  S. R12(K0,K1,K2)
can be obtained from R21(K0,K1,K2) by swapping the subscripts 1 and 2.
The proof of Theorem 7 is given in Appendix E. We obtain the achievable rate region
in Theorem 7 by evaluating the achievable rate region given in Theorem 3 with jointly
Gaussian (Q,U, V1, V2,X) having a specific correlation structure. In particular, Q,U are
selected in accordance with superposition coding, and V1, V2 are encoded by using dirty-
paper encoding [19].
We note that Theorem 4 is a special case of Theorem 7. In other words, the achievable
rate region in Theorem 4 can be obtained from the achievable rate region in Theorem 7. To
this end, one needs to consider only the region R21(K0,K1,K2) with K2 = φ,K1 = K,S =
K0 +K1. After eliminating the redundant bounds from the corresponding region, one can
recover the achievable rate region provided in Theorem 4.
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4 Conclusions
We study the multi-receiver wiretap channel with public and confidential messages. We first
consider the degraded discrete memoryless channel. We provide inner and outer bounds
for the capacity region of the degraded discrete memoryless multi-receiver wiretap channel.
These inner and outer bounds partially match. Thus, we provide a partial characterization of
the capacity region of the degraded discrete memoryless multi-receiver wiretap channel with
public and confidential messages. Second, we provide an inner bound for the capacity region
of the general, not necessarily degraded, multi-receiver wiretap channel. We obtain the inner
bound for the general case by using an achievable scheme that relies on superposition coding,
rate-splitting, binning and Marton’s coding. Third, we consider the degraded Gaussian
MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel. We show that, to evaluate the inner and outer bounds,
that we already proposed for the degraded discrete memoryless channel, for the Gaussian
MIMO case, it is sufficient to consider only the jointly Gaussian auxiliary random variables
and channel input. Consequently, since these inner and outer bounds partially match, we
obtain a partial characterization of the capacity region of the degraded Gaussian MIMO
multi-receiver wiretap channel with public and confidential messages. Finally, we consider
the general, not necessarily degraded, Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel and
propose an inner bound for the capacity region of the general Gaussian MIMO channel.
A Proof of Theorem 2
We define the following auxiliary random variables
Ui = Ws2Wp2Y
i−1
1 Z
n
i+1, i = 1, . . . , n (90)
which satisfy the following Markov chains
Ui → Xi → Y1i → Y2i → Zi, i = 1, . . . , n (91)
due to the fact that the channel is degraded and memoryless. For any (n, 2nRp1, 2nRs1 , 2nRp2,
2nRs2) code achieving the rate tuple (Rp1, Rs1, Rp2, Rs2), due to Fano’s lemma, we have
H(Ws2,Wp2|Y
n
2 ) ≤ nǫn (92)
H(Ws1,Wp1|Ws2,Wp2, Y
n
1 ) ≤ nǫn (93)
where ǫn → 0 as n→∞. Moreover, due to the perfect secrecy requirement in (1), we have
I(Ws1,Ws2;Z
n) ≤ nγn (94)
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where γn → 0 as n→∞. Next, we obtain the following
H(Ws1,Ws2) ≤ H(Ws1,Ws2|Z
n) + nγn (95)
≤ H(Ws1,Ws2,Wp1,Wp2|Z
n) + nγn (96)
where (95) comes from (94). Similarly, we obtain the following
H(Ws2) ≤ H(Ws2|Z
n) + nγn (97)
≤ H(Ws2,Wp2|Z
n) + nγn (98)
where (97) comes from (94). Next, we introduce the following lemmas which will be used
frequently.
Lemma 3 ([2, Lemma 7])
n∑
i=1
I(T n1,i+1;T2i|Q, T
i−1
2 ) =
n∑
i=1
I(T i−12 ;T1i|Q, T
n
1,i+1) (99)
Lemma 4
I(W ;T n1 |Q)− (W ;T
n
2 |Q) =
n∑
i=1
I(W ;T1i|Q, T
i−1
1 , T
n
2,i+1)− I(W ;T2i|Q, T
i−1
1 , T
n
2,i+1) (100)
Lemma 4 can be proved by using Lemma 3.
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First, we obtain an outer bound for the second legitimate user’s confidential message rate
Rs2 as follows
nRs2 = H(Ws2) (101)
≤ H(Ws2,Wp2|Z
n) + nγn (102)
= H(Ws2,Wp2)− I(Ws2,Wp2;Z
n) + nγn (103)
≤ I(Ws2,Wp2; Y
n
2 )− I(Ws2,Wp2;Z
n) + n(ǫn + γn) (104)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Ws2,Wp2; Y2i|Y
i−1
2 , Z
n
i+1)− I(Ws2,Wp2;Zi|Y
i−1
2 , Z
n
i+1) + n(ǫn + γn) (105)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Ws2,Wp2; Y2i|Y
i−1
2 , Z
n
i+1, Zi) + n(γn + ǫn) (106)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Ws2,Wp2, Y
i−1
1 , Y
i−1
2 , Z
n
i+1; Y2i|Zi) + n(γn + ǫn) (107)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Ws2,Wp2, Y
i−1
1 , Z
n
i+1; Y2i|Zi) + n(γn + ǫn) (108)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Ui; Y2i|Zi) + n(γn + ǫn) (109)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Ui; Y2i)− I(Ui;Zi) + n(γn + ǫn) (110)
where (102) comes from (98), (105) is due to Lemma 4. The equalities in (106), (108), and
(110) come from the following Markov chains
Ws2,Wp2, Y
i−1
2 , Z
n
i+1 → Y2i →Zi (111)
Ws2,Wp2, Z
n
i , Y2i → Y
i−1
1 →Y
i−1
2 (112)
Ui → Y2i →Zi (113)
which follow from the fact that the channel is degraded and memoryless.
23
Next, we obtain an outer bound for the confidential message sum rate Rs1+Rs2 as follows
n(Rs1 +Rs2) = H(Ws1,Ws2) (114)
≤ H(Ws1,Wp1,Ws2,Wp2|Z
n) + nγn (115)
= H(Ws1,Wp1,Ws2,Wp2)− I(Ws1,Wp1,Ws2,Wp2;Z
n) + nγn (116)
≤ I(Ws1,Wp1; Y
n
1 |Ws2,Wp2) + I(Ws2,Wp2; Y
n
2 )− I(Ws1,Wp1,Ws2,Wp2;Z
n)
+ n(γn + 2ǫn) (117)
= I(Ws1,Wp1; Y
n
1 |Ws2,Wp2)− I(Ws1,Wp1;Z
n|Ws2,Wp2)
+ I(Ws2,Wp2; Y
n
2 )− I(Ws2,Wp2;Z
n) + n(γn + 2ǫn) (118)
≤ I(Ws1,Wp1; Y
n
1 |Ws2,Wp2)− I(Ws1,Wp1;Z
n|Ws2,Wp2) +
n∑
i=1
I(Ui; Y2i)− I(Ui;Zi)
+ n(γn + 2ǫn) (119)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Ws1,Wp1; Y1i|Ws2,Wp2, Y
i−1
1 , Z
n
i+1)− I(Ws1,Wp1;Zi|Ws2,Wp2, Y
i−1
1 , Z
n
i+1)
+ I(Ui; Y2i)− I(Ui;Zi) + n(γn + 2ǫn) (120)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Ws1,Wp1; Y1i|Ui)− I(Ws1,Wp1;Zi|Ui) + I(Ui; Y2i)− I(Ui;Zi) + n(γn + 2ǫn) (121)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Ws1,Wp1; Y1i|Ui, Zi) + I(Ui; Y2i)− I(Ui;Zi) + n(γn + 2ǫn) (122)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Ws1,Wp1, Xi; Y1i|Ui, Zi) + I(Ui; Y2i)− I(Ui;Zi) + n(γn + 2ǫn) (123)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi; Y1i|Ui, Zi) + I(Ui; Y2i)− I(Ui;Zi) + n(γn + 2ǫn) (124)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi; Y1i|Ui)− I(Xi;Zi|Ui) + I(Ui; Y2i)− I(Ui;Zi) + n(γn + 2ǫn) (125)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi; Y1i|Ui) + I(Ui; Y2i)− I(Xi;Zi) + n(γn + 2ǫn) (126)
where (115) comes from (96), (119) is due to (110), (120) comes from Lemma 4, (122), (124),
(125) and (126) are due to the following Markov chain
Ws1,Wp1, Ui → Xi → Y1i → Zi (127)
which is a consequence of the fact that the channel is memoryless and degraded.
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Next, we obtain an outer bound for the sum rate of the second legitimate user’s public
and confidential messages Rp2 +Rs2 as follows
n(Rp2 +Rs2) = H(Wp2,Ws2) (128)
≤ I(Ws2,Wp2; Y
n
2 ) + nǫn (129)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Ws2,Wp2; Y2i|Y
i−1
2 ) + nǫn (130)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Ws2,Wp2, Y
i−1
1 , Z
n
i+1; Y2i|Y
i−1
2 )− I(Y
i−1
1 , Z
n
i+1; Y2i|Ws2,Wp2, Y
i−1
2 ) + nǫn (131)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Ws2,Wp2, Y
i−1
1 , Y
i−1
2 , Z
n
i+1; Y2i)− I(Y
i−1
1 , Z
n
i+1; Y2i|Ws2,Wp2, Y
i−1
2 ) + nǫn (132)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Ws2,Wp2, Y
i−1
1 , Z
n
i+1; Y2i)− I(Y
i−1
1 , Z
n
i+1; Y2i|Ws2,Wp2, Y
i−1
2 ) + nǫn (133)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Ui; Y2i)− I(Y
i−1
1 , Z
n
i+1; Y2i|Ws2,Wp2, Y
i−1
2 ) + nǫn (134)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Ui; Y2i) + nǫn (135)
where (133) comes from the following Markov chain
Ws2,Wp2, Z
n
i+1, Y2i → Y
i−1
1 → Y
i−1
2 (136)
which is a consequence of the fact that the channel is memoryless and degraded.
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Finally, we obtain an outer bound for the sum rate Rp1 +Rs1 +Rp2 +Rs2 as follows
n(Rp1 +Rs1 +Rp2 +Rs2) = H(Wp1,Ws1,Wp2,Ws2) (137)
= H(Wp2,Ws2) +H(Wp1,Ws1|Wp2,Ws2) (138)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Ui; Y2i)− I(Y
i−1
1 , Z
n
i+1; Y2i|Y
i−1
2 ,Ws2,Wp2) + nǫn +H(Wp1,Ws1|Wp2,Ws2) (139)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Ui; Y2i)− I(Y
i−1
1 , Z
n
i+1; Y2i|Y
i−1
2 ,Ws2,Wp2) + I(Wp1,Ws1; Y
n
1 |Wp2,Ws2) + 2ǫn
(140)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Ui; Y2i)− I(Y
i−1
1 , Z
n
i+1; Y2i|Y
i−1
2 ,Ws2,Wp2) + I(Wp1,Ws1; Y1i|Wp2,Ws2, Y
i−1
1 )
+ 2nǫn (141)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Ui; Y2i)− I(Y
i−1
1 , Z
n
i+1; Y2i|Y
i−1
2 ,Ws2,Wp2) + I(Wp1,Ws1, Z
n
i+1; Y1i|Wp2,Ws2, Y
i−1
1 )
+ 2nǫn (142)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Ui; Y2i)− I(Y
i−1
1 , Z
n
i+1; Y2i|Y
i−1
2 ,Ws2,Wp2) + I(Z
n
i+1; Y1i|Wp2,Ws2, Y
i−1
1 )
+ I(Wp1,Ws1; Y1i|Wp2,Ws2, Y
i−1
1 , Z
n
i+1) + 2nǫn (143)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Ui; Y2i)− I(Y
i−1
1 , Z
n
i+1; Y2i|Y
i−1
2 ,Ws2,Wp2) + I(Z
n
i+1; Y1i|Wp2,Ws2, Y
i−1
1 )
+ I(Wp1,Ws1; Y1i|Ui) + 2nǫn (144)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Ui; Y2i)− I(Z
n
i+1; Y2i|Y
i−1
2 ,Ws2,Wp2)− I(Y
i−1
1 ; Y2i|Y
i−1
2 ,Ws2,Wp2, Z
n
i+1)
+ I(Zni+1; Y1i|Wp2,Ws2, Y
i−1
1 ) + I(Wp1,Ws1; Y1i|Ui) + 2nǫn (145)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Ui; Y2i)− I(Y
i−1
2 ;Zi|Ws2,Wp2, Z
n
i+1)− I(Y
i−1
1 ; Y2i|Y
i−1
2 ,Ws2,Wp2, Z
n
i+1)
+ I(Y i−11 ;Zi|Wp2,Ws2, Z
n
i+1) + I(Wp1,Ws1; Y1i|Ui) + 2nǫn (146)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Ui; Y2i)− I(Y
i−1
2 ;Zi|Ws2,Wp2, Z
n
i+1)− I(Y
i−1
1 ; Y2i|Y
i−1
2 ,Ws2,Wp2, Z
n
i+1)
+ I(Y i−12 , Y
i−1
1 ;Zi|Wp2,Ws2, Z
n
i+1) + I(Wp1,Ws1; Y1i|Ui) + 2nǫn (147)
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=
n∑
i=1
I(Ui; Y2i)− I(Y
i−1
1 ; Y2i|Y
i−1
2 ,Ws2,Wp2, Z
n
i+1) + I(Y
i−1
1 ;Zi|Wp2,Ws2, Z
n
i+1, Y
i−1
2 )
+ I(Wp1,Ws1; Y1i|Ui) + 2nǫn (148)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Ui; Y2i)− I(Y
i−1
1 ; Y2i, Zi|Y
i−1
2 ,Ws2,Wp2, Z
n
i+1) + I(Y
i−1
1 ;Zi|Wp2,Ws2, Z
n
i+1, Y
i−1
2 )
+ I(Wp1,Ws1; Y1i|Ui) + 2nǫn (149)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Ui; Y2i)− I(Y
i−1
1 ; Y2i|Y
i−1
2 ,Ws2,Wp2, Z
n
i+1, Zi) + I(Wp1,Ws1; Y1i|Ui) + 2nǫn (150)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Ui; Y2i) + I(Wp1,Ws1; Y1i|Ui) + 2nǫn (151)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Ui; Y2i) + I(Wp1,Ws1, Xi; Y1i|Ui) + 2nǫn (152)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Ui; Y2i) + I(Xi; Y1i|Ui) + 2nǫn (153)
where (139) comes from (134), (146) is obtained by using Lemma 3, (147) is due to the
following Markov chain
Y i−12 → Y
i−1
1 →Wp2,Ws2, Z
n
i+1, Zi (154)
which comes from the fact that the channel is degraded and memoryless, (149) is a conse-
quence of the following Markov chain
Ws2Wp2Y
i−1
1 Y
i−1
2 Z
n
i+1 → Y2i → Zi (155)
which also comes from the fact that the channel is degraded and memoryless, and (153) is
due to the following Markov chain
Ws1Wp1Ui → Xi → Y1i (156)
which is a consequence of the fact that the channel is memoryless. The bounds in (110),
(126), (135) and (153) can be single-letterized yielding the bounds given in Theorem 2.
B Proof of Theorem 3
Here, we first consider a more general scenario than the scenario introduced in Section 2.3.
In this more general scenario, the transmitter sends a pair of common public and confidential
messages to the legitimate users in addition to a pair of public and confidential messages
intended to each legitimate user. Thus, in this case, the transmitter has the message tu-
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ple (Wp0,Ws0,Wp1,Ws1,Wp2,Ws2), where the common public message Wp0 and the common
confidential message Ws0 are sent to both legitimate users, and a pair of public and confi-
dential messages (Wpj,Wsj) are sent to the jth legitimate user, j = 1, 2
4. Here also, there
is no secrecy concern on the public messages Wp0,Wp1,Wp2 while the confidential messages
Ws0,Ws1,Ws2 need to be transmitted in perfect secrecy, i.e., they need to satisfy the following
lim
n→∞
1
n
I(Ws0,Ws1,Ws2;Z
n) = 0 (157)
The definition of a code, achievable rates, and the capacity region for this more general
scenario can be given similar to the definitions of a code, achievable rates, and the capacity
region we provided in Section 2. Here, we provide the proof of Theorem 3 in two steps.
In the first step, we prove an achievable rate region for the more general scenario we just
introduced. In the second step, we obtain the achievable rate region in Theorem 3 from
the achievable rate region proved in the first step by using Fourier-Motzkin elimination in
conjunction with the fact that since the common public and confidential messages Wp0,Ws0
are decoded by both users, they can be converted into public and confidential messages
(Wp1,Ws1,Wp2,Ws2) of the legitimate users.
B.1 Part I
We fix the joint distribution p(q, u, v1, v2, x, y1, y2, z) as follows
p(q, u)p(v1, v2, x|u)p(y1, y2, z|x) (158)
Next, we divide the common public message rate Rp0 into two parts as follows.
Rp0 = R˜p0 +
˜˜
Rp0 (159)
In other words, we divide the common public messageWp0 into two parts asWp0 = (W˜p0,
˜˜
Wp0),
where the rate of W˜p0 is R˜p0, and the rate of
˜˜
Wp0 is
˜˜
Rp0. We use rate-splitting for the common
public message because due to [2], we know that rate-splitting might enhance the achievable
public and confidential message rate pairs even for the single legitimate user case.
Codebook generation:
• Generate 2nR˜p0 length-n sequences qn through p(qn) =
∏n
i=1 p(qi), and index them as
qn(w˜p0), where w˜p0 ∈ {1, . . . , 2
nR˜p0}.
• For each qn(w˜p0) sequence, generate 2
n( ˜˜Rp0+Rs0+∆0) length-n sequences un through
4Another way to obtain the achievable rate region in Theorem 3 is to use rate-splitting for
Wp1,Ws1,Wp2,Ws2 as we mentioned earlier in Section 2.3. However, we chose to introduce a pair of common
public and confidential messages here, because the corresponding scenario results in an achievable scheme
that encompasses the one we can obtain by using rate-splitting.
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p(un|qn) =
∏n
i=1 p(ui|qi), and index them as u
n(w˜p0, ˜˜wp0, ws0, d0), where ˜˜wp0 ∈ {1, . . . ,
2n
˜˜
Rp0}, ws0 ∈ {1, . . . , 2
nRs0}, d0 ∈ {1, . . . , 2
n∆0}.
• For each un(w˜p0, ˜˜wp0, ws0, d0) sequence, generate 2
n(Rp1+Rs1+∆1+L1) length-n sequences
vn1 through p(v
n
1 |u
n) =
∏n
i=1 p(v1i|ui), and index them as v
n
1 (w˜p0, ˜˜wp0, ws0, d0, wp1, ws1, d1,
l1), where wp1 ∈ {1, . . . , 2
nRp1}, ws1 ∈ {1, . . . , 2
nRs1}, d1 ∈ {1, . . . , 2
n∆1}, l1 ∈ {1, . . . , 2
nL1}.
• For each un(w˜p0, ˜˜wp0, ws0, d0) sequence, generate 2
n(Rp2+Rs2+∆2+L2) length-n sequences
vn2 through p(v
n
2 |u
n) =
∏n
i=1 p(v2i|ui), and index them as v
n
2 (w˜p0, ˜˜wp0, ws0, d0, wp2, ws2, d2,
l2), where wp2 ∈ {1, . . . , 2
nRp2}, ws2 ∈ {1, . . . , 2
nRs2}, d2 ∈ {1, . . . , 2
n∆2}, l2 ∈ {1, . . . , 2
nL2}.
Encoding: Assume Wp0 = wp0,Ws0 = ws0,Wp1 = wp1,Ws1 = ws1,Wp2 = wp2,Ws2 = ws2
is the message to be transmitted. Randomly pick d0, d1, d2. Next, we find an (l1, l2) pair
such that the corresponding sequence tuple (qn, un, vn1 , v
n
2 ) is jointly typical. Due to mutual
covering lemma [22], if L1, L2 satisfy
L1 + L2 ≥ I(V1;V2|U) (160)
with high probability, there exists at least one pair (l1, l2) such that the corresponding
sequence tuple (qn, un, vn1 , v
n
2 ) is jointly typical.
Decoding:
• The first legitimate user decodes (wp0, ws0, d0, wp1, ws1, d1) in two steps. In the first step,
it decodes (wp0, ws0, d0) by looking for the unique (q
n, un) pair such that (qn, un, yn1 ) is
jointly typical. If the following conditions are satisfied,
Rp0 +Rs0 +∆0 ≤ I(U ; Y1) (161)
˜˜
Rp0 +Rs0 +∆0 ≤ I(U ; Y1|Q) (162)
the first legitimate user can decode (wp0, ws0, d0) with vanishingly small probability of
error.
In the second step, it decodes (ws1, wp1, d1) by looking for the unique (q
n, un, vn1 ) tuple
such that (qn, un, vn1 , y
n
1 ) is jointly typical. Assuming that (wp0, ws0, d0) is decoded
correctly in the first step, if the following condition is satisfied,
Rp1 +Rs1 +∆1 + L1 ≤ I(V1; Y1|U) (163)
the first legitimate user can decode (wp1, ws1, d1) with vanishingly small probability of
error.
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• Similarly, the second legitimate user can decode (wp0, ws0, d0, wp2, ws2, d2) with vanish-
ingly small probability of error if the following conditions are satisfied.
Rp0 +Rs0 +∆0 ≤ I(U ; Y2) (164)
˜˜
Rp0 +Rs0 +∆0 ≤ I(U ; Y2|Q) (165)
Rp2 +Rs2 +∆2 + L2 ≤ I(V2; Y2|U) (166)
Equivocation computation: We now show that the proposed coding scheme satisfies the per-
fect secrecy requirement on the confidential messages given by (157). We start as follows.
H(Ws0,Ws1,Ws2|Z
n)
≥ H(Ws0,Ws1,Ws2|Z
n, Qn) (167)
= H(Ws0,Ws1,Ws2,
˜˜
Wp0,Wp1,Wp2, D0, D1, D2|Z
n, Qn)
−H( ˜˜Wp0,Wp1,Wp2, D0, D1, D2|Z
n, Qn,Ws0,Ws1,Ws2) (168)
= H(Ws0,Ws1,Ws2,
˜˜
Wp0,Wp1,Wp2, D0, D1, D2|Q
n)
− I(Ws0,Ws1,Ws2,
˜˜
Wp0,Wp1,Wp2, D0, D1, D2;Z
n|Qn)
−H( ˜˜Wp0,Wp1,Wp2, D0, D1, D2|Z
n, Qn,Ws0,Ws1,Ws2) (169)
= H(Ws0,Ws1,Ws2) +H(
˜˜
Wp0,Wp1,Wp2, D0, D1, D2)
− I(Ws0,Ws1,Ws2,
˜˜
Wp0,Wp1,Wp2, D0, D1, D2;Z
n|Qn)
−H( ˜˜Wp0,Wp1,Wp2, D0, D1, D2|Z
n, Qn,Ws0,Ws1,Ws2) (170)
= H(Ws0,Ws1,Ws2) + n(
˜˜
Rp0 +Rp1 +Rp2 +∆0 +∆1 +∆2)
− I(Ws0,Ws1,Ws2,
˜˜
Wp0,Wp1,Wp2, D0, D1, D2;Z
n|Qn)
−H( ˜˜Wp0,Wp1,Wp2, D0, D1, D2|Z
n, Qn,Ws0,Ws1,Ws2) (171)
≥ H(Ws0,Ws1,Ws2) + n(
˜˜
Rp0 +Rp1 +Rp2 +∆0 +∆1 +∆2)
− I(Ws0,Ws1,Ws2,
˜˜
Wp0,Wp1,Wp2, D0, D1, D2, U
n, V n1 , V
n
2 ;Z
n|Qn)
−H( ˜˜Wp0,Wp1,Wp2, D0, D1, D2|Z
n, Qn,Ws0,Ws1,Ws2) (172)
= H(Ws0,Ws1,Ws2) + n(
˜˜
Rp0 +Rp1 +Rp2 +∆0 +∆1 +∆2)
− I(Un, V n1 , V
n
2 ;Z
n|Qn)−H( ˜˜Wp0,Wp1,Wp2, D0, D1, D2|Z
n, Qn,Ws0,Ws1,Ws2) (173)
≥ H(Ws0,Ws1,Ws2) + n(
˜˜
Rp0 +Rp1 +Rp2 +∆0 +∆1 +∆2)
− n(I(U, V1, V2;Z|Q) + γ1n)−H(
˜˜
Wp0,Wp1,Wp2, D0, D1, D2|Z
n, Qn,Ws0,Ws1,Ws2)
(174)
where (170)-(171) follow from the facts that the messagesWs0,Ws1,Ws2,
˜˜
Wp0,Wp1,Wp2, D0, D1,
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D2 are independent among themselves, uniformly distributed, and also are independent of
Qn, (173) stems from the fact that given the codewords (Qn, Un, V n1 , V
n
2 ), (Ws0,Ws1,Ws2,
˜˜
Wp0,
Wp1,Wp2, D0, D1, D2) and Z
n are independent, (174) comes from the fact that
I(Un, V n1 , V
n
2 ;Z
n|Qn) ≤ nI(U, V1, V2;Z|Q) + nγ1n (175)
where γ1n → 0 as n → ∞. The bound in (175) can be shown by following the analysis
in [23]. Next, we consider the conditional entropy term in (174). To this end, we introduce
the following lemma.
Lemma 5 We have
H(Wp1,Wp2, D1, D2|Z
n, Qn,Ws0,Ws1,Ws2,
˜˜
Wp0, D0) ≤ nγ2n (176)
where γ2n → 0 as n→∞, if the following conditions are satisfied.
Rp1 +∆1 + L1 +Rp2 +∆2 + L2 ≤ I(V1, V2;Z|U) + I(V1;V2|U) (177)
Rp1 +∆1 + L1 ≤ I(V1;Z, V2|U) (178)
Rp2 +∆2 + L2 ≤ I(V2;Z, V1|U) (179)
The proof of Lemma 5 is given in Appendix C. Using this lemma, we have the following
corollary.
Corollary 7 We have
H( ˜˜Wp0, D0|Z
n, Qn,Ws0,Ws1,Ws2) ≤ nγ3n (180)
where γ3n → 0 as n→∞, if the following condition is satisfied.
˜˜
Rp0 +∆0 ≤ I(U ;Z|Q) (181)
Now, we set the rates ˜˜Rp0,∆0, Rp1,∆1, L1, Rp2,∆2, L2 as follows.
˜˜
Rp0 +∆0 = I(U ;Z|Q)− ǫ (182)
L1 + L2 = I(V1;V2|U) +
ǫ
2
(183)
Rp1 +∆1 +Rp2 +∆2 = I(V1, V2;Z|U)− ǫ (184)
Rp1 +∆1 + L1 < I(V1;Z, V2|U) (185)
Rp2 +∆2 + L2 < I(V2;Z, V1|U) (186)
In view of Lemma 5 and Corollary 7, the selections of ˜˜Rp0,∆0, Rp1,∆1, L1, Rp2,∆2, L2 in
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(182)-(186) imply that
H( ˜˜Wp0,Wp1,Wp2, D0, D1, D2|Z
n, Qn,Ws0,Ws1,Ws2)
= H( ˜˜Wp0, D0|Z
n, Qn,Ws0,Ws1,Ws2) +H(Wp1,Wp2, D1, D2|Z
n, Qn,Ws0,Ws1,Ws2,
˜˜
Wp0, D0)
(187)
≤ n(γ2n + γ3n) (188)
using which in (174), we get
H(Ws0,Ws1,Ws2|Z
n) ≥ H(Ws0,Ws1,Ws2) + n(
˜˜
Rp0 +Rp1 +Rp2 +∆0 +∆1 +∆2)
− n(I(U, V1, V2;Z|Q) + γ1n)− n(γ2n + γ3n) (189)
Moreover, using (182)-(184) in (189), we have
H(Ws0,Ws1,Ws2|Z
n) ≥ H(Ws0,Ws1,Ws2)− n
3ǫ
2
− n(γ1n + γ2n + γ3n) (190)
which implies that the proposed coding scheme satisfies the perfect secrecy requirement on
the confidential messages; completing the equivocation computation.
B.2 Part II
We have shown that rate tuples (Rp0, Rs0, Rp1, Rs1, Rp2, Rs2) satisfying the following con-
straints are achievable.
L1 + L2 = I(V1;V2|U) (191)
Rp0 +Rs0 +∆0 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) (192)
˜˜
Rp0 +Rs0 +∆0 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj|Q) (193)
Rp1 +Rs1 +∆1 + L1 ≤ I(V1; Y1|U) (194)
Rp2 +Rs2 +∆2 + L2 ≤ I(V2; Y2|U) (195)
˜˜
Rp0 +∆0 = I(U ;Z|Q) (196)
Rp1 +∆1 +Rp2 +∆2 = I(V1, V2;Z|U) (197)
Rp1 +∆1 + L1 ≤ I(V1;Z, V2|U) (198)
Rp2 +∆2 + L2 ≤ I(V2;Z, V1|U) (199)
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We eliminate ∆0 from the bounds in (191)-(199) by using Fourier-Motzkin elimination, which
leads to the following region.
L1 + L2 = I(V1;V2|U) (200)
Rp0 +Rs0 + I(U ;Z|Q)−
˜˜
Rp0 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) (201)
Rs0 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj |Q)− I(U ;Z|Q) (202)
Rp1 +Rs1 +∆1 + L1 ≤ I(V1; Y1|U) (203)
Rp2 +Rs2 +∆2 + L2 ≤ I(V2; Y2|U) (204)
Rp1 +∆1 +Rp2 +∆2 = I(V1, V2;Z|U) (205)
Rp1 +∆1 + L1 ≤ I(V1;Z, V2|U) (206)
Rp2 +∆2 + L2 ≤ I(V2;Z, V1|U) (207)
0 ≤ ˜˜Rp0 (208)
˜˜
Rp0 ≤ Rp0 (209)
˜˜
Rp0 ≤ I(U ;Z|Q) (210)
Next, we eliminate ˜˜Rp0 from the bounds in (200)-(210) by using Fourier-Motzkin elimination,
which leads to the following region.
L1 + L2 = I(V1;V2|U) (211)
Rp0 +Rs0 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) (212)
Rs0 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj|Q)− I(U ;Z|Q) (213)
Rp1 +Rs1 +∆1 + L1 ≤ I(V1; Y1|U) (214)
Rp2 +Rs2 +∆2 + L2 ≤ I(V2; Y2|U) (215)
Rp1 +∆1 +Rp2 +∆2 = I(V1, V2;Z|U) (216)
Rp1 +∆1 + L1 ≤ I(V1;Z, V2|U) (217)
Rp2 +∆2 + L2 ≤ I(V2;Z, V1|U) (218)
(219)
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Next, we eliminate L1 from the bounds in (211)-(219) by using Fourier-Motzkin elimination,
which leads to the following region.
Rp0 +Rs0 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) (220)
Rs0 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj|Q)− I(U ;Z|Q) (221)
Rp1 +Rs1 +∆1 + I(V1;V2|U)− L2 ≤ I(V1; Y1|U) (222)
Rp2 +Rs2 +∆2 + L2 ≤ I(V2; Y2|U) (223)
Rp1 +∆1 +Rp2 +∆2 = I(V1, V2;Z|U) (224)
Rp1 +∆1 + I(V1;V2|U)− L2 ≤ I(V1;Z, V2|U) (225)
Rp2 +∆2 + L2 ≤ I(V2;Z, V1|U) (226)
L2 ≤ I(V1;V2|U) (227)
0 ≤ L2 (228)
Next, we eliminate L2 from the bounds in (220)-(228) by using Fourier-Motzkin elimination,
which leads to the following region.
Rp0 +Rs0 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) (229)
Rs0 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj |Q)− I(U ;Z|Q) (230)
Rs1 ≤ I(V1; Y1|U)− I(V1;Z|U) (231)
Rs2 ≤ I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V2;Z|U) (232)
Rs1 +Rs2 ≤ I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V1;V2|U)− I(V1, V2;Z|U) (233)
Rp1 +Rs1 +∆1 ≤ I(V1; Y1|U) (234)
Rp2 +Rs2 +∆2 ≤ I(V2; Y2|U) (235)
Rp1 +∆1 ≤ I(V1;Z, V2|U) (236)
Rp2 +∆2 ≤ I(V2;Z, V1|U) (237)
Rp1 +∆1 +Rp2 +∆2 = I(V1, V2;Z|U) (238)
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We eliminate ∆1 from the bounds in (229)-(238) by using Fourier-Motzkin elimination, which
leads to the following region.
Rp0 +Rs0 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) (239)
Rs0 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj|Q)− I(U ;Z|Q) (240)
Rs1 ≤ I(V1; Y1|U)− I(V1;Z|U) (241)
Rs2 ≤ I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V2;Z|U) (242)
Rs1 +Rs2 ≤ I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V1;V2|U)
− I(V1, V2;Z|U) (243)
Rs1 + I(V1, V2;Z|U)− Rp2 −∆2 ≤ I(V1; Y1|U) (244)
Rp2 +Rs2 +∆2 ≤ I(V2; Y2|U) (245)
I(V1, V2;Z|U)− Rp2 −∆2 ≤ I(V1;Z, V2|U) (246)
Rp2 +∆2 ≤ I(V2;Z, V1|U) (247)
0 ≤ I(V1, V2;Z|U)− Rp1 − Rp2 −∆2 (248)
0 ≤ ∆2 (249)
We eliminate ∆2 from the bounds in (239)-(249) by using Fourier-Motzkin elimination, which
leads to the following region.
Rp0 +Rs0 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) (250)
Rs0 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj|Q)− I(U ;Z|Q) (251)
Rs1 ≤ I(V1; Y1|U)− I(V1;Z|U) (252)
Rs2 ≤ I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V2;Z|U) (253)
Rs1 +Rs2 ≤ I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V1;V2|U)− I(V1, V2;Z|U) (254)
Rp1 +Rs1 ≤ I(V1; Y1|U) (255)
Rp2 +Rs2 ≤ I(V2; Y2|U) (256)
Rp1 ≤ I(V1;Z, V2|U) (257)
Rp2 ≤ I(V2;Z, V1|U) (258)
Rp1 +Rp2 ≤ I(V1, V2;Z|U) (259)
We note the fact that each legitimate user’s own confidential message rate Rsj can be given up
in favor of its public message rateRpj, j = 1, 2, i.e., if the rate tuple (Rp0, Rs0, Rp1, Rs1, Rp2, Rs2)
is achievable, the rate tuple (Rp0, Rs0, Rp1+α1, Rs1−α1, Rp2+α2, Rs2−α2) is also achievable
for any non-negative (α1, α2) pairs satisfying α1 ≤ Rs1, α2 ≤ Rs2. Using this fact for the
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region given by (250)-(259), we obtain the following region.
Rp0 +Rs0 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) (260)
Rs0 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj|Q)− I(U ;Z|Q) (261)
Rs1 + α1 ≤ I(V1; Y1|U)− I(V1;Z|U) (262)
Rs2 + α2 ≤ I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V2;Z|U) (263)
Rs1 +Rs2 + α1 + α2 ≤ I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V1;V2|U)− I(V1, V2;Z|U) (264)
Rp1 +Rs1 ≤ I(V1; Y1|U) (265)
Rp2 +Rs2 ≤ I(V2; Y2|U) (266)
Rp1 − α1 ≤ I(V1;Z, V2|U) (267)
Rp2 − α2 ≤ I(V2;Z, V1|U) (268)
Rp1 +Rp2 − α1 − α2 ≤ I(V1, V2;Z|U) (269)
0 ≤ α1 (270)
0 ≤ α2 (271)
α1 ≤ Rp1 (272)
α2 ≤ Rp2 (273)
We first eliminate α1 from the bounds in (260)-(273) by using Fourier-Motzkin elimination,
which leads to the following region.
Rp0 +Rs0 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) (274)
Rs0 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj|Q)− I(U ;Z|Q) (275)
Rs1 ≤ I(V1; Y1|U)− I(V1;Z|U) (276)
Rs1 +Rp1 +Rp2 − α2 ≤ I(V1; Y1|U)− I(V1;Z|U) + I(V1, V2;Z|U) (277)
Rs1 +Rp1 +Rs2 + α2 ≤ I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V2;Z|U) (278)
Rs1 +Rp1 +Rs2 +Rp2 ≤ I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V1;V2|U) (279)
Rs1 +Rs2 + α2 ≤ I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V1;V2|U)− I(V1, V2;Z|U) (280)
Rp2 − α2 ≤ I(V1, V2;Z|U) (281)
Rs2 + α2 ≤ I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V2;Z|U) (282)
Rp1 +Rs1 ≤ I(V1; Y1|U) (283)
Rp2 +Rs2 ≤ I(V2; Y2|U) (284)
Rp2 − α2 ≤ I(V2;Z, V1|U) (285)
0 ≤ α2 (286)
α2 ≤ Rp2 (287)
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Next, we eliminate α2 from the bounds in (274)-(287) by using Fourier-Motzkin elimination,
which leads to the following region.
Rp0 +Rs0 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) (288)
Rs0 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj|Q)− I(U ;Z|Q) (289)
Rs1 ≤ I(V1; Y1|U)− I(V1;Z|U) (290)
Rs2 ≤ I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V2;Z|U) (291)
Rs1 +Rs2 ≤ I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V1;V2|U)− I(V1, V2;Z|U) (292)
Rp1 +Rs1 ≤ I(V1; Y1|U) (293)
Rp2 +Rs2 ≤ I(V2; Y2|U) (294)
Rs1 +Rp1 +Rs2 ≤ I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V2;Z|U) (295)
Rs1 +Rs2 +Rp2 ≤ I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V1;Z|U) (296)
Rs1 +Rp1 +Rs2 +Rp2 ≤ I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V1;V2|U) (297)
We note the fact that since the common public message is decoded by both legitimate users,
its rate Rp0 can be given up in favor of each legitimate user’s own public message rate
Rpj, j = 1, 2, i.e., if the rate tuple (Rs0, Rp0, Rs1, Rp1, Rs2, Rp2) is achievable, the rate tuple
(Rp0 − α − β,Rs0, Rp1 + α,Rs1, Rp2 + β,Rs2) is also achievable for any non-negative (α, β)
pairs satisfying α + β ≤ Rp0. Using this fact for the region given by (288)-(297), we obtain
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the following region.
α + β +Rs0 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) (298)
Rs0 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj|Q)− I(U ;Z|Q) (299)
Rs1 ≤ I(V1; Y1|U)− I(V1;Z|U) (300)
Rs2 ≤ I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V2;Z|U) (301)
Rs1 +Rs2 ≤ I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V1;V2|U)
− I(V1, V2;Z|U) (302)
Rp1 − α +Rs1 ≤ I(V1; Y1|U) (303)
Rp2 − β +Rs2 ≤ I(V2; Y2|U) (304)
Rs1 +Rp1 − α +Rs2 ≤ I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V2;Z|U) (305)
Rs1 +Rs2 +Rp2 − β ≤ I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V1;Z|U) (306)
Rs1 +Rp1 − α +Rs2 +Rp2 − β ≤ I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V1;V2|U) (307)
0 ≤ α (308)
0 ≤ β (309)
α ≤ Rp1 (310)
β ≤ Rp2 (311)
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We eliminate α from the bounds in (298)-(311) by using Fourier-Motzkin elimination, which
leads to the following region.
β +Rs0 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) (312)
Rs0 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj|Q)− I(U ;Z|Q) (313)
Rs1 ≤ I(V1; Y1|U)− I(V1;Z|U) (314)
Rs2 ≤ I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V2;Z|U) (315)
Rs1 +Rs2 ≤ I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V1;V2|U)
− I(V1, V2;Z|U) (316)
Rp2 − β +Rs2 ≤ I(V2; Y2|U) (317)
Rs1 +Rs2 +Rp2 − β ≤ I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V1;Z|U) (318)
Rs1 +Rs2 +Rp2 − β ≤ I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V1;V2|U) (319)
Rs0 + β +Rp1 +Rs1 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) + I(V1; Y1|U) (320)
β +Rs0 +Rs1 +Rp1 +Rs2 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) + I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)
− I(V2;Z|U) (321)
Rs0 +Rs1 +Rp1 +Rs2 +Rp2 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) + I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)
− I(V1;V2|U) (322)
0 ≤ β (323)
β ≤ Rp2 (324)
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Next, we eliminate β from the bounds in (312)-(324) by using Fourier-Motzkin elimination,
which leads to the following region.
Rs0 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj|Q)− I(U ;Z|Q) (325)
Rs1 ≤ I(V1; Y1|U)− I(V1;Z|U) (326)
Rs2 ≤ I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V2;Z|U) (327)
Rs1 +Rs2 ≤ I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V1;V2|U)
− I(V1, V2;Z|U) (328)
Rs0 +Rs1 +Rp1 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) + I(V1; Y1|U) (329)
Rs0 +Rs2 +Rp2 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) + I(V2; Y2|U) (330)
Rs0 +Rs1 +Rp1 +Rs2 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) + I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)
− I(V2;Z|U) (331)
Rs0 +Rs1 +Rs2 +Rp2 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) + I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)
− I(V1;Z|U) (332)
Rs0 +Rs1 +Rp1 +Rs2 +Rp2 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) + I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)
− I(V1;V2|U) (333)
We note the fact that since the common confidential message is decoded by both legitimate
users, its rate can be given up in favor of each legitimate user’s own confidential message
rate Rsj, j = 1, 2, i.e., if the rate tuple (Rp0, Rs0, Rp1, Rs1, Rp2, Rs2) is achievable, the rate
tuple (Rp0, Rs0 − α − β,Rp1, Rs1 + α,Rp2, Rs2 + β) is also achievable for any non-negative
(α, β) pairs satisfying α + β ≤ Rs0. Using this fact for the region given by (325)-(333), we
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obtain the following region.
α + β ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj|Q)− I(U ;Z|Q) (334)
Rs1 − α ≤ I(V1; Y1|U)− I(V1;Z|U) (335)
Rs2 − β ≤ I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V2;Z|U) (336)
Rs1 +Rs2 − α− β ≤ I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V1;V2|U)− I(V1, V2;Z|U) (337)
β +Rs1 +Rp1 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) + I(V1; Y1|U) (338)
α+Rs2 +Rp2 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) + I(V2; Y2|U) (339)
Rs1 +Rp1 +Rs2 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) + I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V2;Z|U) (340)
Rs1 +Rs2 +Rp2 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) + I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V1;Z|U) (341)
Rs1 +Rp1 +Rs2 +Rp2 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) + I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V1;V2|U) (342)
0 ≤ α (343)
0 ≤ β (344)
α ≤ Rs1 (345)
β ≤ Rs2 (346)
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We eliminate α from the bounds in (334)-(346) by using Fourier-Motzkin elimination, which
leads to the following region.
β ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj|Q)− I(U ;Z|Q) (347)
Rs1 + β ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj|Q) + I(V1; Y1|U)− I(U, V1;Z|Q) (348)
Rs2 − β ≤ I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V1;V2|U)− I(V1, V2;Z|U) (349)
Rs2 − β ≤ I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V2;Z|U) (350)
Rs1 +Rs2 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj|Q) + I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V1;V2|U)
− I(U, V1, V2;Z|Q) (351)
Rs2 +Rp2 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) + I(V2; Y2|U) (352)
β +Rs1 +Rp1 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) + I(V1; Y1|U) (353)
Rs1 +Rp1 +Rs2 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) + I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V2;Z|U) (354)
Rs1 +Rs2 +Rp2 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) + I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V1;Z|U) (355)
Rs1 +Rp1 +Rs2 +Rp2 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) + I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V1;V2|U) (356)
Rs1 + 2Rs2 +Rp2 − β ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) + I(V1; Y1|U) + 2I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V1;V2|U)
− I(V1, V2;Z|U) (357)
0 ≤ β (358)
β ≤ Rs2 (359)
0 ≤ I(V1; Y1|U)− I(V1;Z|U) (360)
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We eliminate β from the bounds in (347)-(360) by using Fourier-Motzkin elimination, which
leads to the following region.
Rs1 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj|Q) + I(V1; Y1|U)− I(U, V1;Z|Q) (361)
Rs2 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj|Q) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(U, V2;Z|Q) (362)
Rs1 +Rs2 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj|Q) + I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V1;V2|U)
− I(U, V1, V2;Z|Q) (363)
Rs1 +Rp1 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) + I(V1; Y1|U) (364)
Rs2 +Rp2 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) + I(V2; Y2|U) (365)
Rs1 +Rp1 +Rs2 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) + I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V2;Z|U) (366)
Rs1 +Rp1 +Rs2 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) + 2I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V1;V2|U)
− I(V1, V2;Z|U) (367)
Rs1 +Rs2 +Rp2 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) + I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V1;Z|U) (368)
Rs1 +Rs2 +Rp2 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) + I(V1; Y1|U) + 2I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V1;V2|U)
− I(V1, V2;Z|U) (369)
Rs1 +Rp1 +Rs2 +Rp2 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) + I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V1;V2|U) (370)
0 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj|Q)− I(U ;Z|Q) (371)
0 ≤ I(V1; Y1|U)− I(V1;Z|U) (372)
0 ≤ I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V2;Z|U) (373)
0 ≤ I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V1;V2|U)− I(V1, V2;Z|U) (374)
Finally, we note that we can remove the bounds in (371)-(374) without enlarging the region
given by (361)-(370), which will leave us with the desired achievable rate region given in
Theorem 3; completing the proof.
C Proof of Lemma 5
Assume that the eavesdropper tries to decodeWp1, D1, L1,Wp2, D2, L2 by using its knowledge
of (Ws0,Ws1,Ws2,Wp0). In particular, assume that, given (Ws0 = ws0,Ws1 = ws1,Ws2 =
ws1,Wp0 = wp0), the eavesdropper tries to decode Wp1, D1, L1,Wp2, D2, L2 by looking for the
unique (V n1 , V
n
2 ) such that (q
n, un, vn1 , v
n
2 , z
n) is jointly typical. There are four possible error
events:
• Ee0 = {(q
n, un, vn1 , v
n
2 , z
n) is not jointly typical for the transmitted (qn, un, vn1 , v
n
2 )},
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• Eei = {(Wp1, D1, L1) 6= (1, 1, 1), (Wp2, D2, L2) 6= (1, 1, 1), and the corresponding tuple
(qn, un, vn1 , v
n
2 , z
n) is jointly typical},
• Eeii = {(Wp1, D1, L1) = (1, 1, 1), (Wp2, D2, L2) 6= (1, 1, 1), and the corresponding tuple
(qn, un, vn1 , v
n
2 , z
n) is jointly typical},
• Eeiii = {(Wp1, D1, L1) 6= (1, 1, 1), (Wp2, D2, L2) = (1, 1, 1), and the corresponding tuple
(qn, un, vn1 , v
n
2 , z
n) is jointly typical},
Thus, the probability of decoding error at the eavesdropper is given by
Pr[Ee] = Pr[Ee0 ∪ E
e
i ∪ E
e
ii ∪ E
e
iii] (375)
≤ Pr[Ee0 ] + Pr[E
e
i ] + Pr[E
e
ii] + Pr[E
e
iii] (376)
≤ ǫ1n + Pr[E
e
i ] + Pr[E
e
ii] + Pr[E
e
iii] (377)
where we first use the union bound, and next the fact that Pr[Ee0 ] ≤ ǫ1n for some ǫ1n satisfying
ǫ1n → 0 as n → ∞, which follows from the properties of the jointly typical sequences [13].
Next, we consider the first term in (377) as follows
Pr[Eei ] ≤
∑
(wp1,d1,l1)6=(1,1,1)
(wp2,d2,l2)6=(1,1,1)
Pr[(qn, un, V n1 , V
n
2 , Z
n) ∈ Anǫ ] (378)
≤
∑
(wp1,d1,l1)6=(1,1,1)
(wp2,d2,l2)6=(1,1,1)
∑
(vn
1
,vn
2
,zn)∈Anǫ
p(vn1 |u
n)p(vn2 |u
n)p(zn|un) (379)
≤
∑
(wp1,d1,l1)6=(1,1,1)
(wp2,d2,l2)6=(1,1,1)
∑
(vn
1
,vn
2
,zn)∈Anǫ
2−n(H(V1|U)−γǫ)2−n(H(V2|U)−γǫ)2−n(H(Z|U)−γǫ) (380)
=
∑
(wp1,d1,l1)6=(1,1,1)
(wp2,d2,l2)6=(1,1,1)
|Anǫ |2
−n(H(V1|U)+H(V2|U)+H(Z|U)−3γǫ) (381)
≤
∑
(wp1,d1,l1)6=(1,1,1)
(wp2,d2,l2)6=(1,1,1)
2n(H(V1,V2,Z|U)+γǫ)2−n(H(V1|U)+H(V2|U)+H(Z|U)−3γǫ) (382)
=
∑
(wp1,d1,l1)6=(1,1,1)
(wp2,d2,l2)6=(1,1,1)
2−n(I(V1,V2;Z|U)+I(V2;V1|U)−4γǫ) (383)
≤ 2n(Rp1+∆1+L1+Rp2+∆2+L2)2−n(I(V1,V2;Z|U)+I(V2;V1|U)−4γǫ) (384)
where Anǫ denotes the typical set, γǫ is a constant which is a function of ǫ, and satisfies
γǫ → 0 as ǫ→ 0, (379) comes from the way we generated the sequences (q
n, un, vn1 , v
n
2 ), (380)
stems from the properties of the typical sequences [13], and (382) comes from the bounds on
the size of the typical set Anǫ [13]. Equation (384) implies that Pr[E
e
i ] vanishes as n→∞ if
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the following condition is satisfied.
Rp1 +∆1 + L1 +Rp2 +∆2 +Rp2 < I(V1, V2;Z|U) + I(V2;V1|U)− 4γǫ (385)
Next, we consider Pr[Eeii] as follows
Pr[Eeii] ≤
∑
(wp2,d2,l2)6=(1,1,1)
Pr[(qn, un, vn1 , V
n
2 , Z
n) ∈ Anǫ ] (386)
≤
∑
(wp2,d2,l2)6=(1,1,1)
∑
(vn
2
,zn)∈Anǫ
p(vn2 |u
n)p(zn|un, vn1 ) (387)
≤
∑
(wp2,d2,l2)6=(1,1,1)
∑
(vn
2
,zn)∈Anǫ
2−n(H(V2|U)−γǫ)2−n(H(Z|U,V1)−γǫ) (388)
=
∑
(wp2,d2,l2)6=(1,1,1)
|Anǫ |2
−n(H(V2|U)−γǫ)2−n(H(Z|U,V1)−γǫ) (389)
≤
∑
(wp2,d2,l2)6=(1,1,1)
2n(H(V2,Z|U,V1)+γǫ)2−n(H(V2|U)−γǫ)2−n(H(Z|U,V1)−γǫ) (390)
=
∑
(wp2,d2,l2)6=(1,1,1)
2−n(I(V2;Z,V1|U)−3γǫ) (391)
≤ 2n(Rp2+∆2+L2)2−n(I(V2;Z,V1|U)−3γǫ) (392)
where (387) comes from the way we generated sequences (qn, un, vn1 , v
n
2 ), (388) is due to the
properties of the typical sequences [13], and (390) comes from the bounds on the typical set
Anǫ [13]. Equation (392) implies that Pr[E
e
ii] → 0 as n → ∞ if the following condition is
satisfied.
Rp2 +∆2 + L2 < I(V2;Z, V1|U)− 3γǫ (393)
Similarly, we can show that Pr[Eeiii]→ 0 as n→∞ if the following condition is satisfied.
Rp1 +∆1 + L1 < I(V1;Z, V2|U)− 3γǫ (394)
Thus, we have shown that if the rates (Rp1,∆1, L1, Rp2,∆2, L2) satisfy (385), (393), (394), the
eavesdropper can decode Wp1, D1, L1,Wp2, D2, L2 by using its knowledge of (Ws0,Ws1,Ws2,
Wp0), i.e., Pr[E
e] vanishes as n→∞. In view of this fact, using Fano’s lemma, we get
H(Wp1, D1, L1,Wp2, D2, L2|Z
n, Qn,Ws0,Ws1,Ws2,Wp0, D0) ≤ nγ2n (395)
where γ2n → 0 as n→∞; completing the proof.
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D Proofs of Theorems 5 and 6
D.1 Background
We need some properties of the Fisher information and the differential entropy, which are
provided next.
Definition 1 ([7], Definition 3) Let (U,X) be an arbitrarily correlated length-n random
vector pair with well-defined densities. The conditional Fisher information matrix of X given
U is defined as
J(X|U) = E
[
ρ(X|U)ρ(X|U)⊤
]
(396)
where the expectation is over the joint density f(u,x), and the conditional score function
ρ(x|u) is
ρ(x|u) = ∇ log f(x|u) =
[
∂ log f(x|u)
∂x1
. . .
∂ log f(x|u)
∂xn
]⊤
(397)
We first present the conditional form of the Cramer-Rao inequality, which is proved in [7].
Lemma 6 ([7], Lemma 13) Let U,X be arbitrarily correlated random vectors with well-
defined densities. Let the conditional covariance matrix of X be Cov(X|U) ≻ 0, then we
have
J(X|U)  Cov(X|U)−1 (398)
which is satisfied with equality if (U,X) is jointly Gaussian with conditional covariance
matrix Cov(X|U).
The following lemma will be used in the upcoming proof. The unconditional version of
this lemma, i.e., the case T = φ, is proved in Lemma 6 of [7].
Lemma 7 ([7], Lemma 6) Let T,U,V1,V2 be random vectors such that (T,U) and
(V1,V2) are independent. Moreover, let V1,V2 be Gaussian random vectors with covariance
matrices Σ1,Σ2 such that 0 ≺ Σ1  Σ2. Then, we have
J−1(U+V2|T)−Σ2  J
−1(U+V1|T)−Σ1 (399)
The following lemma addresses the change of the Fisher information with respect to
conditioning.
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Lemma 8 ([7], Lemma 17) Let (V,U,X) be length-n random vectors with well-defined
densities. Moreover, assume that the partial derivatives of f(u|x,v) with respect to xi, i =
1, . . . , n exist and satisfy
max
1≤i≤n
∣∣∣∣∂f(u|v,x)∂xi
∣∣∣∣ ≤ g(u) (400)
for some integrable function g(u). Then, if (U,V,X) satisfy the Markov chainU→ V→ X,
we have
J(X|V)  J(X|U) (401)
The following lemma will also be used in the upcoming proof.
Lemma 9 ([7], Lemma 8) Let K1,K2 be positive semi-definite matrices satisfying 0 
K1  K2, and f(K) be a matrix-valued function such that f(K)  0 for K1  K  K2.
Moreover, f(K) is assumed to be gradient of some scalar field. Then, we have
∫
K2
K1
f(K)dK ≥ 0 (402)
The following generalization of the de Bruijn identity [16, 24] is due to [17], where the
unconditional form of this identity, i.e., U = φ, is proved. Its generalization to this condi-
tional form for an arbitrary U is rather straightforward, and is given in Lemma 16 of [7].
Lemma 10 ([7], Lemma 16) Let (U,X) be an arbitrarily correlated random vector pair
with finite second order moments, and also be independent of the random vector N which is
zero-mean Gaussian with covariance matrix ΣN ≻ 0. Then, we have
∇ΣNh(X+N|U) =
1
2
J(X+N|U) (403)
The following lemma is due to [25, 26] which lower bounds the differential entropy in
terms of the Fisher information matrix.
Lemma 11 ([25, 26]) Let (U,X) be an (n+ 1)-dimensional random vector, where the con-
ditional Fisher information matrix of X, conditioned on U , exists. Then, we have
h(X|U) ≥
1
2
log |(2πe)J−1(X|U)| (404)
We also need the following fact about strictly positive definite matrices.
Lemma 12 Let A,B be two positive definite matrices, i.e., A ≻ 0,B ≻ 0. If A  B, we
have A−1  B−1.
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D.2 Proofs
First, we prove Theorem 5 by showing that for any (U, V,X), there exists a Gaussian
(UG, V G,XG) which provides a larger region. Essentially, this proof will also yield a proof
for Theorem 6 because the outer bound in Theorem 2 is defined by the same inequalities
that define the inner bound given in Theorem 1 except the inequality in (11). Thus, we only
provide the proof of Theorem 5.
First step: We consider the bound on Rs2 given in (8) as follows
Rs2 ≤ I(U ;Y2)− I(U ;Z) (405)
= [h(Y2)− h(Z)] + [h(Z|U)− h(Y2|U)] (406)
First, we consider the first term in (406) as follows
h(Z)− h(Y2) =
1
2
∫
ΣZ
Σ2
J(X+N)dΣN (407)
which follows from Lemma 10, and N is a Gaussian random vector with covariance matrix
ΣN satisfying Σ2  ΣN  ΣZ . We note that due to Lemma 6, we have
J(X+N)  (Cov(X) +ΣN )
−1  (S+ΣN)
−1 (408)
where the second inequality comes from Lemma 12 and the fact that E
[
XX⊤
]
 S. Using
this inequality in (407), we get
h(Z)− h(Y2) ≥
1
2
∫
ΣZ
Σ2
(S+ΣN)
−1dΣN (409)
=
1
2
log
|S+ΣZ|
|S+Σ2|
(410)
where (409) comes from Lemma 9.
Next, we consider the second term in (406) as follows
h(Z|U)− h(Y2|U) =
1
2
∫
ΣZ
Σ2
J(X+N|U)dΣN (411)
which follows from Lemma 10, and N is a Gaussian random vector with covariance matrix
ΣN satisfying Σ2  ΣN  ΣZ . Using Lemma 7, for any ΣN satisfying Σ2  ΣN  ΣZ , we
have
J−1(X+N2|U)−Σ2  J
−1(X+N|U)−ΣN  J
−1(X+NZ|U)−ΣZ (412)
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Due to Lemma 12, the inequalities in (412) imply
[
J−1(X+NZ|U)−ΣZ +ΣN
]−1
 J(X+N|U) 
[
J−1(X+N2|U)−Σ2 +ΣN
]−1
(413)
Using these inequalities in (411) in conjunction with Lemma 9, we get
1
2
log
|J−1(X+NZ |U)|
|J−1(X+NZ)−ΣZ +Σ2|
≤ h(Z|U)− h(Y2|U) ≤
1
2
log
|J−1(X+N2|U)−Σ2 +ΣZ |
|J−1(X+N2)|
(414)
which can be expressed as
f(0) ≤ h(Z|U)− h(Y2|U) ≤ f(1) (415)
where f(t) is defined as
f(t) =
1
2
log
|K1(t) +ΣZ |
|K1(t) +Σ2|
, 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 (416)
and K1(t) is given by
K1(t) = (1− t)
[
J−1(X+NZ|U)−ΣZ
]
+ t
[
J−1(X+N2|U)−Σ2
]
(417)
Since f(t) is continuous in t, due to the intermediate value theorem, there exists a t∗1 such
that 0 ≤ t∗1 ≤ 1, and
f(t∗1) = h(Z|U)− h(Y2|U) (418)
=
1
2
log
|K1 +ΣZ|
|K1 +Σ2|
(419)
where K1 = K1(t
∗
1). Since 0 ≤ t
∗
1 ≤ 1, K1 satisfies
J−1(X+N2|U)−Σ2  K1  J
−1(X+NZ|U)−ΣZ (420)
in view of (417). Moreover, we have
K1  J
−1(X+NZ|U)−ΣZ (421)
 J−1(X+NZ)−ΣZ (422)
 Cov(X+NZ)−ΣZ (423)
 Cov(X) (424)
 S (425)
where (422) is due to Lemma 8 and (423) comes from Lemma 6. Thus, in view of (420) and
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(425), K1 satisfies
J−1(X+N2|U)−Σ2  K1  S (426)
Now, using (410) and (419) in (406), we get the following bound on Rs2
Rs2 ≤
1
2
log
|S+Σ2|
|K1 +Σ2|
−
1
2
log
|S+ΣZ |
|K1 +ΣZ|
(427)
which completes the first step of the proof.
Second step: We consider the bound on the confidential message sum rate Rs1 + Rs2 given
in (9) as follows
Rs1 +Rs2 ≤ I(U ;Y2) + I(X;Y1|U)− I(X;Z) (428)
= [h(Y2)− h(Z)] + [h(Y1|U)− h(Y2|U)]−
1
2
log
|Σ1|
|ΣZ|
(429)
≤
1
2
log
|S+Σ2|
|S+ΣZ|
+ [h(Y1|U)− h(Y2|U)]−
1
2
log
|Σ1|
|ΣZ |
(430)
where (430) comes from (410). Next, we consider the remaining term in (430) as follows
h(Y2|U)− h(Y1|U) =
1
2
∫
Σ2
Σ1
J(X+N|U)dΣN (431)
which follows from Lemma 10, and N is a Gaussian random vector with covariance matrix
ΣN satisfying Σ1  ΣN  Σ2. Due to Lemma 7, for any Gaussian random vector N with
ΣN  Σ2, we have
J−1(X+N|U)−ΣN  J
−1(X+N2|U)−Σ2 (432)
 K1 (433)
where (433) comes from (426). In view of Lemma 12, (433) implies
J(X+N|U)  (K1 +ΣN)
−1, ΣN  Σ2 (434)
Using (434) in (431) in conjunction with Lemma 9, we have
h(Y2|U)− h(Y1|U) ≥
1
2
∫
Σ2
Σ1
(K1 +ΣN)
−1dΣN (435)
=
1
2
log
|K1 +Σ2|
|K1 +Σ1|
(436)
50
Using (436) in (430), we get
Rs1 +Rs2 ≤
1
2
log
|S+Σ2|
|K1 +Σ2|
+
1
2
log
|K1 +Σ1|
|Σ1|
−
1
2
log
|S+ΣZ |
|ΣZ|
(437)
which completes the second step of the proof.
Third step: We consider the bound on Rs2 +Rp2 given in (10) as follows
Rp2 +Rs2 ≤ I(U ;Y2) (438)
= h(Y2)− h(Y2|U) (439)
≤
1
2
log |(2πe)(S+Σ2)| − h(Y2|U) (440)
where (440) comes from the maximum entropy theorem [13]. Next, we consider the remaining
term in (440). Using (419), we have
h(Y2|U) = h(Z|U)−
1
2
log
|K1 +ΣZ|
|K1 +Σ2|
(441)
≥
1
2
log |(2πe)J−1(X+NZ |U)| −
1
2
log
|K1 +ΣZ |
|K1 +Σ2|
(442)
≥
1
2
log |(2πe)(K1 +ΣZ)| −
1
2
log
|K1 +ΣZ |
|K1 +Σ2|
(443)
=
1
2
log |(2πe)(K1 +Σ2)| (444)
where (442) is due to Lemma 11, and (443) comes from (421) and monotonicity of | · | in
positive semi-definite matrices. Using (444) in (440), we get
Rp2 +Rs2 ≤
1
2
log
|S+Σ2|
|K1 +Σ2|
(445)
which completes the third step of the proof.
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Fourth step: We consider the bound in (11) as follows
Rs1 +Rp2 +Rs2 ≤ I(U ;Y2) + I(X;Y1|U)− I(X;Z|U) (446)
= h(Y2)− h(Y2|U) + [h(Y1|U)− h(Z|U)]−
1
2
log
|Σ1|
|ΣZ|
(447)
≤
1
2
log |(2πe)(S+Σ2)| − h(Y2|U) + [h(Y1|U)− h(Z|U)]−
1
2
log
|Σ1|
|ΣZ|
(448)
≤
1
2
log |(2πe)(S+ΣZ)| −
1
2
log |(2πe)(K1 +Σ2)|+ [h(Y1|U)− h(Z|U)]
−
1
2
log
|Σ1|
|ΣZ|
(449)
=
1
2
log
|S+Σ2|
|K1 +Σ2|
+ [h(Y1|U)− h(Y2|U)] + [h(Y2|U)− h(Z|U)]−
1
2
log
|Σ1|
|ΣZ|
(450)
=
1
2
log
|S+Σ2|
|K1 +Σ2|
+ [h(Y1|U)− h(Y2|U)] +
1
2
log
|K1 +Σ2|
|K1 +ΣZ|
−
1
2
log
|Σ1|
|ΣZ |
(451)
≤
1
2
log
|S+Σ2|
|K1 +Σ2|
+
1
2
log
|K1 +Σ1|
|K1 +Σ2|
+
1
2
log
|K1 +Σ2|
|K1 +ΣZ |
−
1
2
log
|Σ1|
|ΣZ|
(452)
=
1
2
log
|S+Σ2|
|K1 +Σ2|
+
1
2
log
|K1 +Σ1|
|Σ1|
−
1
2
log
|K1 +ΣZ |
|ΣZ|
(453)
where (448) comes from the maximum entropy theorem [13], (449) comes from (444), (451)
is due to (419), and (452) comes from (436).
Fifth step: We consider the bound in (12) as follows
Rp1 +Rs1 +Rp2 +Rs2 ≤ I(U ;Y2) + I(X;Y1|U) (454)
= h(Y2) + [h(Y1|U)− h(Y2|U)]−
1
2
log |(2πe)Σ1| (455)
≤
1
2
log |(2πe)(S+Σ2)|+ [h(Y1|U)− h(Y2|U)]−
1
2
log |(2πe)Σ1| (456)
≤
1
2
log |(2πe)(S+Σ2)|+
1
2
log
|K1 +Σ1|
|K1 +Σ2|
−
1
2
log |(2πe)Σ1| (457)
=
1
2
log
|S+Σ2|
|K1 +Σ2|
+
1
2
log
|K1 +Σ1|
|Σ1|
(458)
where (456) comes from the maximum entropy theorem [13], and (457) comes from (436).
Hence, we have shown that for any feasible (U,X), there exists a Gaussian (UG,XG)
which yields a larger rate region. This completes the proof.
E Proof of Theorem 7
We now obtain an alternative rate region by using the one given by (361)-(374). This
alternative region is more amenable for evaluation for the Gaussian MIMO channel. We
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note that the following region is included in the region given by (361)-(374).
Rs1 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj|Q) + I(V1; Y1|U)− I(V1;V2|U)− I(U ;Z|Q)
− I(V1;Z|U, V2) (459)
Rs2 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj|Q) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(U, V2;Z|Q) (460)
Rs1 +Rs2 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj|Q) + I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V1;V2|U)
− I(U, V1, V2;Z|Q) (461)
Rs1 +Rp1 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) + I(V1; Y1|U)− I(V1;V2|U) (462)
Rs2 +Rp2 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) + I(V2; Y2|U) (463)
Rs1 +Rp1 +Rs2 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) + I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V1;V2|U)
− I(V2;Z|U) (464)
Rs1 +Rs2 +Rp2 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) + I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V1;V2|U)
− I(V1;Z|U, V2) (465)
Rs1 +Rp1 +Rs2 +Rp2 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) + I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V1;V2|U) (466)
0 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj|Q)− I(U ;Z|Q) (467)
0 ≤ I(V1; Y1|U)− I(V1;V2|U)− I(V1;Z|U, V2) (468)
0 ≤ I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V2;Z|U) (469)
53
We note that we can remove the constraints given by (467)-(469) without enlarging the
region given by (459)-(466), which will leave us with the following region.
Rs1 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj|Q) + I(V1; Y1|U)− I(V1;V2|U)− I(U ;Z|Q)
− I(V1;Z|U, V2) (470)
Rs2 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj|Q) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(U, V2;Z|Q) (471)
Rs1 +Rs2 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj|Q) + I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V1;V2|U)
− I(U, V1, V2;Z|Q) (472)
Rs1 +Rp1 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) + I(V1; Y1|U)− I(V1;V2|U) (473)
Rs2 +Rp2 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) + I(V2; Y2|U) (474)
Rs1 +Rp1 +Rs2 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) + I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V1;V2|U)
− I(V2;Z|U) (475)
Rs1 +Rs2 +Rp2 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) + I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V1;V2|U)
− I(V1;Z|U, V2) (476)
Rs1 +Rp1 +Rs2 +Rp2 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) + I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V1;V2|U) (477)
We denote the region given by (470)-(477) by R21. Similarly, the following achievable rate
region can be obtained as well.
Rs1 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj|Q) + I(V1; Y1|U)− I(U, V1;Z|Q) (478)
Rs2 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj|Q) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V1;V2|U)− I(U ;Z|Q)
− I(V2;Z|U, V1) (479)
Rs1 +Rs2 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj|Q) + I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V1;V2|U)
− I(U, V1, V2;Z|Q) (480)
Rs1 +Rp1 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) + I(V1; Y1|U) (481)
Rs2 +Rp2 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V1;V2|U) (482)
Rs1 +Rp1 +Rs2 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) + I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V1;V2|U)
− I(V2;Z|U, V1) (483)
Rs1 +Rs2 +Rp2 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) + I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V1;V2|U)
− I(V1;Z|U) (484)
Rs1 +Rp1 +Rs2 +Rp2 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) + I(V1; Y1|U) + I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V1;V2|U) (485)
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which is denoted by R12. Hence, we obtain the achievable rate region R which is given by
R = conv (R12 ∪ R21) (486)
Next, we outline an alternative method to obtain the region R21. First, we set L1, L2, Rp1,
Rp2,∆1,∆2 as follows.
L1 = I(V1;V2|U) (487)
L2 = 0 (488)
Rp1 +∆1 = I(V1;Z|U, V2) (489)
Rp2 +∆2 = I(V2;Z|U) (490)
Using the values of L1, L2, Rp1 +∆1, Rp2 +∆2 given by (487)-(490) in (191)-(199), we have
the following achievable rate region.
Rp0 +Rs0 +∆0 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj) (491)
˜˜
Rp0 +Rs0 +∆0 ≤ min
j=1,2
I(U ; Yj|Q) (492)
Rs1 ≤ I(V1; Y1|U)− I(V1;V2|U)− I(V1;Z|U, V2) (493)
Rs2 ≤ I(V2; Y2|U)− I(V2;Z|U) (494)
˜˜
Rp0 +∆0 = I(U ;Z|Q) (495)
Rp1 +∆1 = I(V1;Z|U, V2) (496)
Rp2 +∆2 = I(V2;Z|U) (497)
Next, following the procedure in Appendix B.2, the achievable rate region given by (470)-
(477), i.e., R21, can be obtained by using the achievable rate region given by (491)-(497).
Similarly, the other region R12 can be obtained as well. We also note that this alternative
derivation reveals that since we select L1 = I(V1;V2|U), L2 = 0 to obtain the achievable rate
regionR21, in this case, the transmitter first encodes V
n
2 , and then, next using the non-causal
knowledge of V n2 , encodes V
n
1 , i.e., uses Gelfand-Pinsker encoding for V
n
2 .
Next, we obtain an achievable rate region for the Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap
channel with public and confidential messages. We provide this achievable rate region by
evaluating the regions R12 and R21 with a specific choice of Q,U, V1, V2,X. In particular, to
evaluate R21, we use the following selection for Q,U, V1, V2,X:
• Q is selected as a zero-mean Gaussian random vector with covariance matrix S−K0−
K1−K2, whereK0,K1,K2 are positive semi-definite matrices satisfyingK0+K1+K2 
S,
• U is selected as U = Q + Q′, where Q′ is a zero-mean Gaussian random vector with
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covariance matrix K0, and is independent of Q,
• V2 is selected as V2 = U + U2, where U2 is a zero-mean Gaussian random vector with
covariance matrix K2, and is independent of Q,Q
′,
• V1 is selected as V1 = U1+AU2+U , where U1 is a zero-mean Gaussian random vector
with covariance matrix K1, and is independent of Q,Q
′, U2. The encoding matrix A
is given by A = K1 [K1 +Σ1]
−1,
• X is selected as X = Q +Q′ + U2 + U1.
We note that we use dirty-paper coding [19] to encode V1, which leads to the following.
I(V1;Y1|U)− I(V1;V2|U) =
1
2
log
|K1 +Σ1|
|Σ1|
(498)
The other mutual information terms in the region R21 can be computed straightforwardly,
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which leads to the following region.
Rs1 ≤ min
j=1,2
1
2
log
|K0 +K1 +K2 +Σj|
|K1 +K2 +Σj|
+
1
2
log
|K1 +Σ1|
|Σ1|
−
1
2
log
|K0 +K1 +K2 +ΣZ |
|K1 +K2 +ΣZ |
−
1
2
log
|K1 +ΣZ |
|ΣZ|
(499)
Rs2 ≤ min
j=1,2
1
2
log
|K0 +K1 +K2 +Σj|
|K1 +K2 +Σj|
+
1
2
log
|K1 +K2 +Σ2|
|K1 +Σ2|
−
1
2
log
|K0 +K1 +K2 +ΣZ |
|K1 +ΣZ|
(500)
Rs1 +Rs2 ≤ min
j=1,2
1
2
log
|K0 +K1 +K2 +Σj|
|K1 +K2 +Σj|
+
1
2
log
|K1 +K2 +Σ2|
|K1 +Σ2|
+
1
2
log
|K1 +Σ1|
|Σ1|
−
1
2
log
|K0 +K1 +K2 +ΣZ |
|ΣZ |
(501)
Rs1 +Rp1 ≤ min
j=1,2
1
2
log
|S+Σj |
|K1 +K2 +Σj |
+
1
2
log
|K1 +Σ1|
|Σ1|
(502)
Rs2 +Rp2 ≤ min
j=1,2
1
2
log
|S+Σj |
|K1 +K2 +Σj |
+
1
2
log
|K1 +K2 +Σ2|
|K1 +Σ2|
(503)
Rs1 +Rp1 +Rs2 ≤ min
j=1,2
1
2
log
|S+Σj |
|K1 +K2 +Σj |
+
1
2
log
|K1 +Σ1|
|Σ1|
+
1
2
log
|K1 +K2 +Σ2|
|K1 +Σ2|
−
1
2
log
|K1 +K2 +ΣZ |
|K1 +ΣZ |
(504)
Rs1 +Rs2 +Rp2 ≤ min
j=1,2
1
2
log
|S+Σj |
|K1 +K2 +Σj |
+
1
2
log
|K1 +K2 +Σ2|
|K1 +Σ2|
+
1
2
log
|K1 +Σ1|
|Σ1|
−
1
2
log
|K1 +ΣZ |
|ΣZ|
(505)
Rs1 +Rp1 +Rs2 +Rp2 ≤ min
j=1,2
1
2
log
|S+Σj |
|K1 +K2 +Σj |
+
1
2
log
|K1 +K2 +Σ2|
|K1 +Σ2|
+
1
2
log
|K1 +Σ1|
|Σ1|
(506)
We denote the region given in (499)-(506) by R21(K0,K1,K2). Similarly, we can evalu-
ate the region R12 to obtain another achievable rate region R12(K0,K1,K2) for the Gaus-
sian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel, where R12(K0,K1,K2) can be obtained from
R21(K0,K1,K2) by swapping the subscripts 1 and 2.
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